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The establishments of property rights and collective actions are viewed as key strategies 
to support sustainable management of forests and other common pool resources. However, 
previous discussion of the theories either address property rights or collective actions as 
aggregated terms or omit the role of biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. It is not clear 
which property rights or collective actions are effective and under what biophysical and 
socioeconomic circumstance that they have effects. The dissertation analyzes how specific rights 
and collective actions affect deforestation in two studies based on separate sets of institutional 
data obtained from the World Resources Institute and International Forestry Resources and 
Institutions. By integrating remote-sensing, census and site survey data, a wide range of multi-
disciplinary variables such as forest change and coverage, topographic, climate, soil properties, 
population, commercial value of the forest, forest management unit and road accessibility are 
integrated with the institutional data from numerous locations worldwide. Elastic Net and LASSO 
statistical methods are used to select significant individual variables from a large number of 
predictors and their interaction terms without excessive loss of information. Statistical analysis 
methods including linear, generalized linear and truncated normal regression analyses and cross 
validation are used. Both studies lead to similar conclusions. The first study analyzes data from 
28,208 community forests in Cameroon, Colombia and Mexico and indicates that the effects of 
the alienation rights (right to lease, right to lease and collateralize, and a complete set of 
alienation rights) can be either positive, negative or have no correlation, when preventing 
deforestation and reducing deforestation are the concerns. Furthermore, the alienation rights’ 
effects vary across locations. The second study analyzes data from 162 sites in 15 countries and 
indicates that the specific collective actions (existence of rules, rule congruence, monitoring and 
graduated sanction) and property rights (forest ownership, right to withdrawal and right to sell) 
perform differently, with respect to gross deforestation. The effects can be either positive, 
negative or show no correlation, depending on the local biophysical and socioeconomic 
conditions. The studies conclude that we should not assume property rights or collective actions 
would ultimately lead to desired forest outcomes under all local conditions. The potential effects 
of a specific right or action should be treated and implemented differently, and location-based 
solutions developed in the local biophysical and socioeconomic context may be needed to address 
deforestation. It is important that the decision makers, international donor organizations and 
academic researchers be aware of the diverse and contradictory effects of specific rights and 
actions, especially the associated complications of dependence on local biophysical and 
socioeconomic conditions.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Trends 
1.1.1 Global Deforestation 
In the past two decades, the world’s forest area has declined from 281 million square kilometers 
in 1992 to 264 million square kilometers in 2012 (WorldBank, 2015). Remote sensing data shows 
that the total area deforested is much greater than the area reforested. Between 2000 and 2012, 
2.3 million square kilometers of forest have been clear-cut, while only 800,000 square kilometers 
of land has been reforested (Hansen et al., 2013). The drivers of deforestation are a major concern 
to researchers, as this loss of tree cover may have negative economic climatic, and environmental 
consequences (Achard et al., 2002; Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Meyfroidt & Lambin, 2011). 
Gross deforestation, defined as the “loss in forest area over a given time period caused by 
conversion of forest to non-forested land” in Brown and Zarin (2013), has been identified as an 
indicator of the (lack of) protection of native forests.  
 
1.1.2 Decentralization in Forest Management 
Since the mid-1980s, decentralization of forest management has been the predominant trend in 
developing countries. Decentralization is commonly defined as the relocation of administrative 
functions away from a central location (e.g., government) to the closer communities or natural 
users (e.g., villages, tribes, etc.) (Fisher, 2001). Theoretical studies on common pool resources 
(CPR) have highlighted the role of decentralization in forest management—the more 
decentralized the forest’s management, the better the forest’s status (Ostrom et al., 1999; Agrawal 
et al., 2008; Araujo et. al, 2008; Palmer, 2011). The CPR studies suggest that a critical 
precondition of successful CPR management is whether or not the local actors obtain access to 
resources that enable their utilization and profits generated from the CPR (Agrawal, A., & 
Ostrom, E., 2001). Impelled by international organizations and agreements that urge better forest 
management in developing nations, decentralization reform coincided with demands for a greater 
recognition of the local communities’ role in managing local forests and the desire of many 
governments to reduce the financial burden of forest governance (Agrawal & Hardin, 2008).  
 
1.1.3 Variation and separation of Research Paradigms 
Historically, there has been segregation of research paradigms. Traditional ecological 
research often excluded human impacts while the social research generally ignored biophysical 
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drivers (Liu et al., 2007). Nevertheless, biophysical, socioeconomic and institutional factors all 
play roles directly or indirectly on forest as a common-pool resource (CPR). The natural 
generation of a forest is determined mostly by the biophysical characteristics of its location. The 
consumption and utilization of forests are correlated with the local socioeconomic characteristics. 
The management and sustainability of forests are affected by the setup of the related institutional 
arrangements. Furthermore, even though in some cases institutional factors do not have a direct 
effect, they may affect forest outcomes indirectly by shaping the socioeconomic circumstance and 
modifying the biophysical conditions.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundations: from Hardin to Ostrom 
Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons model assumes that individuals are short-term, self-
interested "rational" actors, seeking to maximize their own gains. Such actors will exploit 
commons as long as they believe the costs to them individually are less than the benefits. The 
model suggests that the laissez faire system, leaving individuals making their own decisions, will 
not "as if by an invisible hand" solve the problem of the commons. Viable options include setting 
up formal institutions either in the form of private property rights to commons or enforcing 
constrained access to the commons as public property (Hardin, 1968). Schlager and Ostrom have 
further specified property rights of commons into a bundle of five rights: Access, Withdrawal, 
Management, Exclusion and Alienation (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).  
 
While acknowledging the importance of property rights as a solution to the dilemma of CRP, 
Dietz and Ostrom (2003) argue that Hardin’s claims were oversimplified: 1) only two 
institutional arrangements— centralized government and private property—were there to sustain 
commons over the long run; 2) resource users were trapped in a commons dilemma, unable to 
create solutions. He missed a possibility that the social groups may develop and maintain self-
governing informal institutions or collective action to sustain the commons. Although these 
institutions have not always succeeded, neither have Hardin’s preferred alternatives of private or 
state ownership (Dietz, and Ostrom, 2003). Ostrom takes an empirical approach and finds that in 
many different cultures all over the world, some groups find ways to overcome the obstacles that 
defeated others in managing common-pool resources by creating contracts, agreements, 
incentives, constitutions, and signals as media to enable cooperation for mutual benefit. Ostrom’s 
work suggests people are trapped by the prisoner's dilemma only if they treat themselves as 
prisoners by passively accepting the suboptimum strategy the dilemma locks them into; but if 
they try to work out a contract with the other players, or find the ones most likely to cooperate, or 
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agree on rules for sanctions or artificially change the incentive ratios, they can create an informal 
institution for collective action that benefits them all and hence alter the tragedy of commons 
(Ostrom, 1999). Ostrom specifies eight design principles for sustainable common pool resources 
management: clearly defined boundaries, congruence between the rules and resource 
environment, collective-choice arrangement and participation, monitoring, graduated sanctions, 
conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to organize, and nested enterprises 
(Ostrom, 1990).  
 
1.3 Research Goals 
As a result of research paradigm separation (Liu et al., 2007) and data deficiency (Verburg, 
2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004, 2008), forest resources data generated by various sources often 
come with temporal, spatial and thematic differences and inconsistency (Verburg, 2011). 
Incomplete model specification and omitted variables in hypothesis testing are widely observed in 
the CPR literature (Agrawal, 2001). Therefore, many of the theory-driven studies have not 
investigated the interactions between institutions and local conditions, and the complexity of 
coupled human-nature systems is not well understood (Liu et al., 2007).  
 
This dissertation addresses these challenges by using data integration and data analysis 
methods to understand the detailed effects of specific prosperity rights and collective actions and 
their interactions with local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. I integrate biophysical, 
socioeconomic and institutional data from a wide range of best available multiple public sources. 
I apply Elastic Net and LASSO statistical methods to select significant individual variables from 
a large number of predictors and their interaction terms in a dataset with relatively small sample 
size without excessive loss of information. I seek answers for a series of detailed questions: which 
bundles of property rights and collective actions as institutions are correlated with positive forest 
outcomes? To what extent do they provide such outcomes? Under what biophysical and 
socioeconomic circumstances would an institutional setting work or work better? Is it important 
to incorporate human-nature interaction into forest studies? 
 
The bundle of five resource rights and the eight design principles for resource management 
provide a solid foundation and useful direction to explore the details. Based on two separate sets 
of institutional variable data obtained from the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), the following chapters present two of my 
research works that aim to answer these detailed questions.  
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CHAPTER 2. DETAILS MATER: THE EFFECTS OF 
ALIENATION PROPERTY RIGHTS ON DEFORESTATION 
2.1 Alienation Rights and the Tragedy of Forest Commons 
Remote-sensing data show that in the past decade, we have been losing our forest at three 
times the speed that we are regenerating them (Hansen et al., 2013). The drivers of deforestation 
are a major concern to researchers, as we know that this loss of tree cover has the potential to 
affect temperature, cause economic losses, and create environmental havoc (Achard et al., 2002; 
Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 1999; Meyfroidt & Lambin, 2011). Gross deforestation, defined as the 
“loss in forest area over a given time period caused by conversion of forest to non-forested land” 
in Brown and Zarin (2013), has been used as an indicator of the loss of native forests with higher 
carbon/biodiversity/hydrologic-service–value, in contrast to the planting of new low-value forest. 
In this paper, we focus on gross deforestation and identify the prevention and reduction of gross 
deforestation as a desired outcome in forest management.  
 
Schlager and Ostrom have specified property rights of commons into a bundle of five rights: 
Access, Withdrawal, Management, Exclusion and Alienation, to array property-rights regimes 
from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner (Table 1) (Schlager and Ostrom, 
1992). Schlager and Ostrom’s work provides a useful framework to analyze and understand the 
role of rights in the management of forest commons. 
 
Table 1 Bundle of Rights and Resource Rights Holders 
Right Holder 
Bundle of Rights 
Effective Use of 
Resources Access and 
Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation 
Authorized User √    Weak 
Claimant √ √   Somewhat Weak 
Proprietor √ √ √  Somewhat Strong 
Owner √ √ √ √ Strong 
Source: Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom, 1992 and Coleman, 2011 
 
Among the bundle of rights, alienation rights are believed to be crucial for the effective use of 
resources: “Through the sale or lease of all or part of the property rights owners hold, they can 
capture the benefits produced by long-term investments” (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Also, 
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entitling owners to transfer their land may allow forest resources to be shifted from a less 
productive to a more productive use (Posner, 1973). And hence the right holders with alienation 
rights may have higher incentive to use the resources effectively and to improve forest outcomes. 
This framework has had a significant impact on academic research as well as on local, regional 
and global advocates. Many studies have stressed that property rights insecurity reduces the 
present value of forests and fosters forest conversion into other land uses (Araujo et al., 2009; 
Palmer, 2011). Incomplete land tenure often places greater burdens on community actors and 
makes local community users less flexible in responding to local diversity and change, and may 
contribute to deforestation (Larson and Dahal, 2012; Mendelsohn, 1994). 
 
Because the effects of these modes of alienation rights were not differentiated by Schlager 
and Ostrom, the discussions of the theories often address alienation rights as an aggregated term, 
despite the fact that the alienation rights comprise a group of similar but still distinct modes: right 
to sell, right to collateralize and right to lease. Previous discussions have focused mainly on the 
effect of property rights as an entirety: do property rights interventions affect forest outcomes? 
However, framing research questions in a simplistic way could lead to problematic conclusions. 
Only some specific modes of forest alienation rights may be correlated with positive forest 
outcomes so the effects of forest rights can vary–some modes of rights might lead to positive 
impact and some to negative impact. Furthermore, the effects of forest property rights may also 
be largely constrained by the biophysical and socioeconomic circumstances.  
 
We are interested in pursuing the details in this study: what if we break down and 
differentiate forest alienation rights into specific modes—the right to sell, the right to collateralize 
and the right to lease? We examine the correlation of these modes of ownership rights with 
deforestation trends in different places. Which specific right(s) link to desired or undesired forest 
outcomes? And to what extent do the performances of the specific rights depend on biophysical 
and socioeconomic circumstances? Specifically, this paper investigates the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The effects of the modes of alienation rights on gross deforestation are mixed. 
H2: The effects of modes of alienation rights’ performance on gross deforestation depend on 




2.2 Alienation Rights and Forest Commons: Theory and Empirical Evidence 
Only a few countries have granted full alienation rights to their community lands. The review 
by the Rights and Resources Initiative shows that from the 27 countries studied, community lands 
in 12 countries were given some extent of the alienation right, mostly the right to lease. Only six 
countries allocate a right to sell community lands (RRI, 2014). The hesitation to allocate the right 
to sell and other alienation rights to communities has been attributed to the fear that the granting 
of alienation rights could result in land clearing (Larson et al., 2010).  
 
There is limited empirical evidence on the effect of alienation rights. Coleman (2011) 
analyzed user groups in 13 countries with different bundles of rights and concluded that user 
groups with more complete rights, including alienation rights, are more likely to rank forest 
conditions favorably, and that the perceived effects of property rights also depend on the level of 
adaptive capacity, such as the organizational capacity of the user group and the number of rival 
groups. However, case studies in four locations in Nepal and India did not find alienation rights 
essential to maintain forest conditions (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). The former study measured 
forest outcome by user perception (whether or not the users rank their forests better than others). 
However, physical measurement may come out with different results, as the users may have 
favorable views about the forests under their management. The Agrawal and Ostrom study 
employed a case study approach and did not incorporate the variation of biophysical conditions 
into the analysis, which could potentially miss the impact of local circumstances. To the best of 
our understanding, none of the previous studies have looked into the effect of specific modes of 
alienation rights.  
 
In addition, although studies stressed that property rights insecurity reduces the present value 
of forests and fosters forest conversion into other land uses (Araujo et al., 2009; Palmer, 2011), 
many of the theory-driven interventions (i.e. property rights) have not been investigated for their 
interactions with varied natural systems. Biophysical, socioeconomic and institutional factors 
have significant effects - directly or indirectly - on forests as they affect the value of the resource. 
The natural generation of a forest is determined mostly by the biophysical characteristics of the 
location. The consumption and utilization of a forest is correlated with local socioeconomic 
characteristics. The management and sustainment of a forest is affected by the setup of the related 
institutional arrangements. Furthermore, even though in some cases socioeconomic and 
institutional factors do not have a direct relationship, they may affect forest outcomes indirectly 
by modifying the socioeconomic and biophysical conditions.  
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As a result, existing local case studies have found that private property rights have had mixed 
outcomes (Ostrom et al., 1999; Agrawal et al., 2008; Araujo et. al, 2008; Palmer, 2011; Fisher, 
1999; Anderson, 2000; Pagdee et al., 2006 ; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). “Getting the 
institutions right” is a challenging and yet essentially important process, which may require 
detailed understanding of specific systems (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
2.3 Land Tenure in Studied Countries 
Since the 1990’s, many countries, especially those in the developing world, have 
introduced decentralized reforms in the forestry sector by emphasizing private property rights. 
The reforms have met the twin demands of recognition of the local community’s role and the 
desire of governments to reduce their financial burden (Agrawal et al., 2008). In Colombia, Afro-
Colombian and indigenous communities hold 26% of the rural lands and own 22.1 million 
hectares and 5.4 million hectares of forestland, respectively (USAID, 2010). The 1991 
Constitution recognized and outlined a framework for collective land rights for indigenous groups 
and Afro-Colombian communities. A legal change in 1995 allowed both communities to register 
their rights to the territories they have occupied historically (White and Martin, 2002). However, 
the constitution indicates that the indigenous reserves and the Afro-Colombian community lands 
are inalienable (Art. 63, Colombian Constitution, 1991; Art. 7, Law N° 70/1993; as cited in RRI, 
2012). 
 
In Cameroon, the 20 million hectares of forests cover 40% of the nation’s territory, in 
which 301 communities own over 1 million hectares (Mertens et al., 2012). The forest law 
provides for forest management. To register for community forests, the communities must map 
the boundary and inventory the forest resources (USAID, 2011), which give them some forms of 
excludability. By signing a Community Forest Management Agreement with the Forestry 
Administration, the communities are entitled with the right to access, withdrawal and 
management, for a period up to 15 years (RRI, 2012; USAID, 2011). But the state transfers only 
the right to use and benefit and maintains control over the forest ownership (Law N° 01/1994; 
Decree N° 531/1995; Logo 2007, 4; as cited in RRI, 2012). The community is allowed to lease 
the land within the limitation of the management plan (Art. 54, Law N° 01/1994; Art. 95 and 96, 
Decree N° 531/1995; as cited in RRI, 2012). 
 
In Mexico, there are two types of community lands, ejidos and comunidades. These two types 
of community lands account for more than half of the nation’s land and 70% of the country’s 
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forests (Larson et al., 2010). The ejidos and comunidades are lands owned by a community. Both 
groups are entitled with a right to lease and a right to collateralize (Article 10, 46, 59, 64, 73, 75, 
107, Agrarian Law, 2008; as cited in RRI, 2012). But they are different in two aspects. First, the 
ejido lands are divided into parcels and each of the ejidatario have user rights to their own 
parcels. On the other hand, the communidades lands follow a communitarian property scheme 
(Robles and Peskett, 2012). Second, the ejidos are entitled with a right to sell while the 
communidades lands cannot be sold. The forestlands in the ejidos can be sold to the ejidatario 
from the same ejido as specified in the Agrarian Law reform in 1992 (Robles and Peskett, 2012). 
The 2008 Agrarian Law reform further lifted the constraint to allow the ejidatario to transfer 
common land title to commercial or civil cooperation in cases if needed for the ejido’s population 
(Art. 75, Agrarian Law, 2008; as cited in RRI, 2012).  
 
The community forests spatial data available in Cameroon, Colombia and Mexico allow us to 
explore the effects of alienation rights and their dependence on local circumstances. These 
countries were selected as a result of data availability. In these countries, most of the forest rights 
are homogenous, except the alienation rights (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Forest Property Rights in Studied Countries* 
 Access Withdrawal  Management Exclusion 
Alienation 
Lease Collateral Sale 
Cameroon 
√ √ √ √ √ x x 
Colombia √ √ √ √ x x x 
Mexico √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Ejido √ 
Comunidades x 
 *adapted from Resource Right Initiative (2014), What Future for Reform? Progress and slowdown in forest tenure 
reform since 2002 
 
2.4 Data and Data Processing 
2.4.1 Data Description 
Two sets of variables are included in the analysis: 1) the response variables, referring to gross 
deforestation; and 2) the predictive variables, which include the modes of forest alienation rights, 
biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. The data are collected from best available multiple 
public sources.  
 
The response variable is the gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013, measured in the 
form of the total area of deforestation within designated boundaries. The spatial resolution of the 
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original data is 30-meters (Hansen et al., 2013). The gross deforestation is calculated by 
multiplying the number of pixels within each of the community forest boundaries by 900 square 
meters (the size of the pixels). 
 
Table 3 List of Data and Variables 
Variables Details 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Gross deforestation Gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013, measured in the form of the total 
area of deforestation within the boundary of the individual community 
forestland (Hansen, 2013) 
Percentage deforestation Gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013 divided by the forest coverage in 
2000 (Hansen, 2013) 
PREDICTIVE VARIABLES 
Forest Alienation Rights  
Right to sell, collateralize and lease A binary variable indicating whether the forest owners have a complete set of 
alienation rights (RRI, 2014) 
Right to sell and collateralize  A binary variable indicates whether the forest owners have the right to 
collateralize and right to sell (RRI, 2014) 
Right to lease A binary variable indicating whether the forest owners have the right to lease 
(RRI, 2014) 
Biophysical   
Size of Forest Forest coverage in 2000, measure in the form of total area of forest within the 
boundary of the individual community forestland (Hansen, 2015) 
Soil productivity Global Soil Productivity Index, range from 0 to 1 (UNEP, 2016) 
Altitude Mean altitude of the community forestland (Jarvis et al., 2008) 
Temperature Annual mean temperature (Hijmans et al., 2005) 
Precipitation Annual mean precipitation (Hijmans et al., 2005) 
Socioeconomic  
Population Total Population (GPWv4) (CIESIN, 2015) 
Road Inaccessibility Distance to main road (CIESIN, 2013) 
Unit of Analysis  
Community forestlands The spatial document outlining the boundary of the community forest (WRI, 
2016) 
 
The institutional variables include 4 modes of forest rights: a) the community forestlands 
in Colombia have no alienation rights; b) the community forests in Cameroon are entitled with 
right to lease only; 3) the communidades forestlands in Mexico have the right to collateralize and 
the right to lease, and; 4) the ejido forestlands in Mexico have the most complete set of alienation 
rights: right to sell, right to collateralize and right to lease (RRI, 2014).  
 
The biophysical variables include altitude, temperature and precipitation. The spatial 
resolution of the altitude data is 90 meters (Jarvis et al., 2008). The temperature and precipitation 
data are available at 1-kilometers resolution (Hijmans et al., 2005). The mean altitude, 
temperature and precipitation are the values of average altitude, temperature and precipitation 
within each of the community forest boundaries, respectively. The socioeconomic variables 
include population and road inaccessibility. The spatial resolution of the population data is 1 
kilometer (CIESIN, 2014). The total population is calculated as the sum of the number of 
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individuals within each of the community forest boundaries. The road inaccessibility variable is 
generated from the Global Roads Open Access Data Set (CIESIN, 2013), calculated as the 
distance between the each of the community forestlands and the nearest main roads.   
 
The unit of analysis is the individual community forest. Instead of downscaling the unit to 
grid cell level, we assume the forest users’ activities are constrained by the land ownership 
boundaries. We argue that using community forest will keep the decision-making arena as the 
unit of analysis and the analysis will hence detect how human decisions interact with the natural 
system. The spatial boundaries of the community forestlands are obtained from World Resources 
Institute’s Global Forest Watch Portal (WRI, 2015). 
 
2.4.2 Data Processing 
The data layers are overlaid and a dataset is generated for each of the community forestlands 
following the steps below:  
Step1: Obtain the spatial file of the boundary of the study sites and link the sites to gross 
deforestation, institutions, and biophysical and socioeconomic variables maps 
Step 2: Resample the biophysical and socioeconomic variables from 1-kilometers to 30-
meters resolution 
Step 3: Calculate the value of gross deforestation and the biophysical and socioeconomic 
variables within the land ownership boundaries 
Step 4: Conduct regression analyses and hypotheses testing 
 
Figure 1 Data Processing 
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2.4.3 Data Summary 
To test the hypotheses, data from 28,208 community forests in the three countries are 
analyzed. The forests included in the study represent all community forests in the subject 
countries but are not a random sample of all community forests over the world. The distribution 
of the data shows that gross deforestation, the response variable, has two modes (Appendix: 
Figure 3). One mode concentrates on zero and the other follows a Gamma distribution. The two 
groups are analyzed separately. The summary statistics of the variables are presented by modes of 
alienation rights in Table 4. The data from Columbia, with no alienation rights, comes with the 
largest average base year forest area (426.8 square kilometers) in 2000, compared to the rest of 
the groups (29.9, 22.9, 5.4 square kilometers). However, group a)’s gross deforestation between 
2000 and 2013 is proportionally smaller (0.6% or 2.7 square kilometers), compared to the other 
groups (3%, 3%, and 7% respectively). The ranges of the biophysical and socioeconomic 
variables are diverse.  
 
Table 4 Summary Statistics of the Variables by Group 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
a) No alienation rights (Colombia) (N=670; 3.05%) 
Deforestation 2000-2013 (square kilometers) 2.7 14.0 0.0 267.4 
Forest Area in 2000 (square kilometers) 426.8 3,095.0 0.0 60,702.7 
Altitude (meter) 570.8 681.4 0.0 3,279.8 
Precipitation (millimeter) 3,294.5 1,740.7 0.0 9,696.3 
Temperature (°C) 24.4 3.8 0.0 28.4 
Soil Productivity Index 40,574.6 4,445.4 0.0 43,153.2 
Population (thousand persons) 1,393.6 11,803.0 0.0 234,881.8 
Road Inaccessibility (kilometer) 17.4 32.0 0.0 242.8 
b) Right to lease (Cameroon) (N=339, 1.54%) 
Deforestation 2000-2013 (square kilometers) 0.9 1.6 0.0 21.8 
Forest Area in 2000 (square kilometers) 29.9 16.4 0.0 69.5 
Altitude (meter) 655.7 314.7 0.0 2,376.8 
Precipitation (millimeter) 1,715.0 396.8 0.0 3,348.5 
Temperature (°C) 23.7 2.1 0.0 28.3 
Soil Productivity Index 40,847.3 2,464.1 0.0 42,101.3 
Population (thousand persons) 510.7 957.5 0.0 8,221.7 
Road Inaccessibility (kilometer) 1.1 2.2 0.0 13.1 
c) Right to lease and to collateralize (Mexico Communidade) (N=1,608; 7.32%) 
Deforestation 2000-2013 (square kilometers) 0.7 5.0 0.0 202.4 
Forest Area in 2000 (square kilometers) 22.9 110.0 0.0 4,241.1 
Altitude (meter) 1,353.6 819.2 0.0 3,554.3 
Precipitation (millimeter) 1,161.7 561.1 0.0 3,573.8 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics of the Variables by Group (continued) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Temperature (°C) 19.6 4.5 0.0 29.1 
Soil Productivity Index 28,448.0 4,078.0 0.0 32,372.9 
Population (thousand persons) 1,077.0 2,921.0 0.0 77,457.4 
Road Inaccessibility (kilometer) 1.9 3.0 0.0 24.5 
d) Right to lease, to collateralize and to sell (Mexico Ejido) (N=21,981; 88.09%) 
Deforestation 2000-2013 (square kilometers) 0.4 2.5 0.0 156.4 
Forest Area in 2000 (square kilometers) 5.4 24.6 0.0 1,343.5 
Altitude (meter) 1,000.5 897.8 -3.3 3,713.5 
Precipitation (millimeter) 1,048.8 700.8 0.0 4,653.2 
Temperature (°C) 21.2 4.6 0.0 29.3 
Soil Productivity Index 27,726.9 4,184.6 0.0 32,866.9 
Population (thousand persons) 375.5 2,073.9 0.0 250,667.9 
Road Inaccessibility (kilometer) 2.5 4.9 0.0 63.1 
 
 
2.5 Statistical Methodology 
The data analysis includes four steps (Figure 2): 1) Regression models to analyze the variables’ 
relationship with deforestation 2) Outlier analysis to remove the extreme outliers; 3) Variable 
selection to determine the important variables correlated with deforestation; 4) model selection to 
select the final model based on trade-offs between the fit of the model and model complexity. The 
selected models are normalized in order to compare the magnitude of the parameter estimates.  
 
2.5.1 Regression Analyses 
Regression analysis is performed comparing gross deforestation trends with modes of forest 
rights, and with the interactions with socioeconomic and biophysical variables. In the case where 
the base year forest is not zero but deforestation is zero, a logistic regression is applied to 
understand how the modes of alienation rights are associated with zero deforestation. In the case 
where base year forest and deforestation are both not zero, two types of models are applied to 
study the relationship between alienation rights and gross deforestation: 1) Truncated normal 
linear regression. Box-Cox transformation (λ = 0.0202 and λ = 0.0101, respectively) are made, 
based on Box-Cox Analysis (Appendix: Figure 4), to improve the normality of gross 
deforestation and percentage deforestation, the response variables; 2) Generalized linear model 
Gamma distribution log and inverse links, with both gross deforestation and percentage 
deforestation as the response variables. The final model is selected through procedures specified 


















Figure 2 Data Analysis Framework 
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2.5.2 Outlier Analysis 
The Interquartile Range rule is applied to determine the outliers. After fitting the regressions, 
observations with residuals that fall outside the below range are identified as outliers and are 
removed from the dataset (Montgomery and Runger, 2010). 
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑄𝑄1 − 1.5(𝑄𝑄3 − 𝑄𝑄1) 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑄𝑄3 + 1.5(𝑄𝑄3 − 𝑄𝑄1) 
 
𝑄𝑄1and 𝑄𝑄3 are the first and third quartile, respectively. 
 
2.5.3 Variable Selection 
Variable selections based on LASSO and Elastic Net penalties are conducted on the models 
with interaction terms to determine the important variables correlated with deforestation. We use 
a 10-fold cross-validation for finding the tuning parameter. After variable selection, the model 











𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽) = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)
1
2 ‖𝛽𝛽‖ℓ2
2 + 𝛼𝛼‖𝛽𝛽‖ℓ1 






is the elastic net penalty, a compromise between the Ridge regression penalties (𝛼𝛼 = 0) and 
the LASSO penalty (𝛼𝛼 = 1) (Friedman et. al., 2010; Zou and Hastie, 2005; Tibshirani, 1996; 
Hoerl and Kennard, 1970).  
 
2.5.4 Model Selection 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are the general 
methods for model selection. AIC selects a model by making a trade-off between goodness-of-fit 








where, RSS is the residual sum of squares, S is the number of parameters in the model, n is 
the number of observations and  2 is the variance of the model’s residuals. The first part of the 
equation RSS(S)n  is an indicator of lack of fit, which measures the fit of the model. The second part 
of the equation 2|S|σ
2
n  is a penalty for model complexity (Akaike, H., 1974). The model with the 
lowest AIC is selected.  
 
BIC penalizes large models more harshly, compared to AIC (Schwarz, 1978). It aims to 
minimize:  




2.6 Estimation and Inference 
The logistic model on zero deforestation with LASSO penalty comes out with the smallest 
prediction error (Mean Misclassification Error = 0.014) and hence the result of LASSO penalty 
variable selection is chosen (Appendix: Figure 5). The analysis (Table 5) of those areas with zero 
deforestation shows statistically significant correlations with biophysical, socio-economic, and 
property rights characteristics.1 Zero deforestation is negatively correlated with forest size and 
population, and positively correlated with altitude and distance to main road. Having right to 
lease, collateralize and sell (Mexico ejido) decreases the log likelihood of having zero 
deforestation. Right to lease (Cameroon) and right to collateralize in addition to right to lease 
(Mexico communidade) have no statistically significant correlation with the log-odds of having 
zero deforestation.  
 
Having rights to collateralize and to lease in addition in areas with higher precipitation, on 
soil with higher productivity or in locations with more population is associated with decreased log 
likelihood of having zero deforestation, compared to the reference group (no alienation rights). 
On the other hand, having the right to lease and a complete set of alienation rights in areas with 
higher altitude is associated with higher log likelihood of having zero deforestation.  
 
                                                        
1 Due to the complete/quasi separation of the logistic model problem, the coefficients of the fitted regression with 
LASSO penalty are reported.  
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By assessing the parameter estimates, we also notice that the following alienation rights- 
related terms have greater effects: a complete set of alienation rights (-1.36), interaction terms of 
right to lease and a complete set of alienation rights with altitude (3.92 and 1.13, respectively) 
and interaction terms of rights to collateralize and to lease with precipitation (-2.04).  
 
Table 5 Penalized Logistic Estimates of Zero Deforestation 
  Estimate (Penalized) 
(Intercept) -9.35 
Forest Size (log) -8.40 
Altitude 2.24 
Precipitation (log) - 
Temperature - 
Soil Productivity - 
Population (log) -0.58 




Forest Size(log) : Lease - 
Forest Size (log): Collateral+Lease - 












Soil: Sell+Collateral+Lease - 
Population (log) :Lease - 
Popualtion (log) :Collateral+Lease -0.16 
Popualtion (log) :Sell+Collateral+Lease - 
Road Inaccessibility(log):Lease - 
Road Inaccessibility(log):Collateral+Lease - 
Road Inaccessibility(log): Sell+Collateral+Lease - 
 
In the case where deforestation is not zero between the studied periods, after variable 
selection and model selection, the truncated normal model with gross deforestation as the 
response variable with LASSO penalty (Mean Square Error = 0.00123) has the lowest AIC and 
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BIC (AIC = -83,539.2; BIC = -83,286.3) (Appendix: Figure 6) and hence is chosen for further 
inferences. The analysis finds different results to the zero deforestation model (Table 6). Having 
the right to lease, having the right to collateralize and to lease and having a complete set of 
alienation rights are all associated with lower deforestation (λ=0.0202) (-0.46, P = 2.59E-06; -
0.57, P< 2.2e-16; -0.44, P < 2.2e-16).  
 
In addition, statistical analysis shows the alienation rights interact with biophysical and 
socioeconomic terms and come out with diverse outcomes. Compared to the reference group (no 
alienation rights), having a complete set of alienation rights in addition on larger size of forests, 
lands with higher precipitation, warmer temperature, higher population density, or forests far 
away from main roads accelerates gross deforestation. Also, having a right to lease and to 
collateralize in addition on forests of larger size, lands with higher precipitation, higher 
population density or forests far away from main roads increases gross deforestation. Having the 
right to lease on forests with higher precipitation increases gross deforestation but having a right 
to lease in addition on lands with higher soil productivity or far away from main roads decreases 
gross deforestation, compared to the lands without alienation rights.  
 
By assessing the parameter estimates, we also notice the following alienation rights related 
terms have greater effects: a complete set of alienation rights (-0.04), the rights to collateralize 
and to lease (-0.06), right to lease (-0.05), interaction terms of a complete set of alienation rights 
with precipitation and temperature (0.04 and 0.02, respectively), and the interaction term of rights 
to collateralize and to lease with precipitation (0.03).  
 
This section only presents the results of the statistical analysis and the interpretations of the 




Table 6 /LQHDU(VWLPDWHRI*URVV'HIRUHVWDWLRQȜ  
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) 1.2910 0.0046 283.69 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Forest Size (log) 0.0447 0.0014 32.572 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Altitude -0.0515 0.0085 -6.0464 1.5E-09 *** 
Precipitation (log) -0.0217 0.0022 -9.6225 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Temperature -0.0409 0.0073 -5.5708 2.E-08 *** 
Soil Productivity -0.0010 0.0012 -0.9067 0.36 
 Road Inaccessibility (log) -0.0048 0.0014 -3.3935 0.0006 *** 
Lease -0.0460 0.0098 -4.7007 2.6E-06 *** 
Collateral+Lease -0.0567 0.0048 -11.868 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Sell+Collateral+Lease -0.0439 0.0046 -9.6253 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Forest Size(log) : Lease 0.0027 0.0061 0.4387 0.66 
 Forest Size (log): Collateral+Lease 0.0098 0.0019 5.0698 3.98E-07 *** 
Forest Size(log): Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0064 0.0014 4.4874 7.2E-06 *** 
Altitude:Lease -0.0036 0.0196 -0.1860 0.85 
 Altitude:Collateral+Lease 0.0017 0.0091 0.1890 0.85 
 Altitude:Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0044 0.0086 0.5119 0.61 
 Precipitation(log):Lease 0.0116 0.0067 1.7181 0.086 . 
Precipitation(log):Collateral+Lease 0.0403 0.0027 15.058 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Precipitation(log):Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0262 0.0023 11.472 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Temperature:Lease -0.0091 0.0176 -0.5221 0.60 
 Temperature:Collateral+Lease 0.0115 0.0080 1.4455 0.15 
 Temperature:Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0198 0.0074 2.6795 0.0074 ** 
Soil:Lease -0.0067 0.0028 -2.3851 0.0170 * 
Soil:Collateral+Lease 0.0023 0.0015 1.6075 0.108 
 Soil: Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0014 0.0012 1.1824 0.237 
 Population (log) :None 0.0002 0.0009 0.2620 0.793 
 Population (log) :Lease 0.0062 0.0048 1.2882 0.198 
 Popualtion (log) :Collateral+Lease 0.0094 0.0014 6.8046 1.01E-11 *** 
Popualtion (log) :Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0054 0.0003 16.355 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Road Inaccessibility(log):Lease -0.0044 0.0026 -1.6843 0.0921 . 
Road Inaccessibility(log):Collateral+Lease 0.0036 0.0017 2.0796 0.0375 * 
Road Inaccessibility(log): Sell+Collateral+Lease 0.0039 0.0014 2.6951 0.0070 ** 
sigma 0.0342 0.00019 181.64 < 2.2e-16 *** 
      
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
       
Log-Likelihood: 41802 on 33 Df 
  
2.7 Analysis 
When talking about alienation rights’ direct effect, having the right to lease has no direct 
correlation with preventing deforestation (Table 7), compared to the reference group (no 
alienation rights). Furthermore, having the right to lease reduces deforestation. This may be 
because the tenants normally do not have the right to alter land use but to maintain it. Having the 
right to collateralize and lease has no direct correlation with the likelihood of having zero 
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deforestation. But having the right to collateralize and to lease reduces deforestation. This may be 
because a collateral right doesn’t translate into immediate land alteration.  
 
It is interesting to find that when the right to sell is included, it comes out with both negative 
and positive effects. On one hand, having a complete set of alienation rights reduces the 
likelihood of zero deforestation. When local forest owners are given the right to sell, they will 
sometimes do so because this generates benefits greater than they could earn from timber and 
non-timber products in the short run, and possibly even for the long run. That may result in land 
use alteration for higher profit seeking and hence result in deforestation. This reconfirms Clark’s 
economics model, which showed that when the discount rate is high and when there are 
alternative investment options, resource overexploitation is inevitable, even to the point of 
extinction (Clark, 1973). However, on the other hand, when it comes to reducing deforestation, 
the effect of having a complete set of alienation rights is positive - it reduces deforestation, 
compared to the reference group. The finding is in line with Posner and Schagler and Ostrom’s 
model, which suggested that entitling owners to alienate their land may allow forest resources to 
be shifted from a less productive to a more productive use (Posner, 1975; Schagler and Ostrom, 
1992). The analysis shows that either theory provides a plausible explanation for the phenomenon 
but neither is sufficiently precise and comprehensive.   
 
Furthermore, the alienation rights’ interaction effects with biophysical and socioeconomic 
variables are mixed. For instance, in the case of preventing deforestation, the effect of (a) having 
a right to collateralize and to lease on lands with higher precipitation, higher soil productivity or 
higher population is negative - it reduces the log-likelihood of having zero deforestation. 
However, the effect of having (b) a right to lease or having a complete set of alienation rights on 
lands with higher altitude is positive. In case (a), it is rational for the users to sell land with higher 
precipitation, higher soil productivity, more population for other land use purposes (i.e. 
agriculture or housing development), if such a right is granted, as that may return in higher profits 
compared to forests. In case (b), it is perhaps because the lands on higher latitudes are not suitable 
for other land use purposes than forests. Having a right to lease or a right to collateralize and to 
lease may encourage investment in forests.  
 
Overall, when the right to lease has no direct correlation with preventing deforestation, its 
aggregated interaction effect is positive (3.916) – it further increases the log-likelihood of having 
zero deforestation at certain locations. The aggregated effect of the right to lease and its related 
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interactions is positive (3.916). The right to collateralize and to lease has no direct correlation 
with preventing deforestation, however the sum of its interaction effects is negative (-2.510) – it 
accelerates the reduction of the log-likelihood of having zero deforestation under some 
circumstances. The aggregated effect of related terms of rights to collateral and to lease is 
negative (- 2.510). The direct effect of a complete set of alienation rights is negative (-1.361) but 
its interactions effect is positive (1.131) for some locations. The aggregated effect of related terms 
of a complete set of alienation rights is negative (-0.230). 
 
Table 7 Summary of the effects of alienation rights2 
  Preventing Deforestation 
(Response: log-odds of having zero deforestation) 
 Direct Effect Interaction Aggregation 
Lease 
No correlation Positive or No correlation  Positive 
(-) (3.916) (3.916) 
Collateralize + Lease 
No correlation Negative or No correlation Negative 
(-) (-2.510) (-2.510) 
Sell + Collateralize + Lease 
Negative Positive or No correlation  Negative 
 (-1.361) (1.131) (-0.230) 
  Reducing Deforestation 
  5HVSRQVHJURVVGHIRUHVWDWLRQȜ  
 Direct Effect Interaction Aggregation 
Lease 
Positive Mixed Positive 
(-0.046) (0.000) (-0.046) 
Collateralize + Lease 
Positive Negative or no correlation Negative 
(-0.057) (0.063) (0.006) 
Sell + Collateralize + Lease 
Positive Negative or no correlation Negative 
(-0.044) (0.062) (0.011) 
 
When it comes to reducing deforestation, the effects are mostly negative. Having a right to 
collateralize and to lease or a complete set of alienation rights on lands with higher precipitation 
or more population accelerates deforestation and the effects of interactions with higher 
precipitation are the highest among all other interaction terms. This may be because the lands 
with higher precipitation or more population could be more suitable for other land uses (i.e. 
agriculture or housing development) and hence it is rational to convert them for higher profit 
seeking activity. Having a right to collateralize and to lease or a complete set of alienation rights 
on larger forests is negative - selling the excess land to others is a better-off decision. However, 
the actual rationale behind these effects will have to be investigated through research in the field.  
                                                        
2 * The table presents the situation when the terms increase by 1 unit 
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The alienation rights perform differently with regard to road inaccessibility. Road 
inaccessibility is directly negatively correlated with gross deforestation - the farther a land is 
away from a main road, the lesser the gross deforestation. However, on one hand, the effect of (a) 
having a complete set of alienation rights or a right to collateralize and to lease on locations far 
away from main road is negative - it increases gross deforestation, compared to the lands far 
away from main road and that have no alienation rights granted. On the other hand, the effect of 
(b) having a right to lease on lands far away from main road is positive - it decreases gross 
deforestation, compared to the reference group without alienation rights that are far away from 
the main road. In case (a) granting local users a complete set of alienation rights or a right to 
collateralize and to lease accelerates gross deforestation, even on locations difficult to access. In 
case (b), as land tenants normally do not have the right to alternate land uses, having only the 
right to lease decreases gross deforestation for locations far away from a main road, compared to 
lands without alienation rights.  
 
Overall, when having a right to lease is negatively correlated with gross deforestation (-
0.046), its interaction effects are mixed and cancel out (0.000). The aggregated effect of the right 
to lease and its related interactions is positive - it reduces gross deforestation (-0.046). Having a 
right to collateralize and to lease reduces gross deforestation (-0.057), however its interaction 
effects are negative (0.063). The aggregated effect of rights to collateralize and to lease is 
negative - it increases gross deforestation (0.006). A complete set of alienation rights also reduces 
gross deforestation (-0.044), while its interaction terms increase gross deforestation (0.062). The 
aggregated effect of a complete set of alienation rights is negative - increases gross deforestation 
(0.011). 
 
The results suggest that we should not assume alienation rights will translate into purely 
negative or positive forest outcomes. Rather, each of the alienation rights behaves differently and 
the performance of alienation rights depends on the local biophysical and socioeconomic 
circumstances and the outcomes are mixed.  
 
2.8 Limitation of the Study 
We recognize an important limitation of the study. Other important forest rights, such as 
exclusion and withdrawal, could play a critically important role in forest conservation. Also, the 
country effects cannot be decoupled in three of the forest rights categories. However, data 
limitations preclude including these details in this assessment. We need such detailed information 
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because these details may provide a broader understanding of the conditions under which forest 
degradation and regeneration may potentially occur over the long term through human-nature 
interactions. The results may also have implications for other common pool resources. We need 
to know the details of how specific aspects and modes of resource rights affect forest outcomes 
because these details will guide us to craft effective institutions on the ground to conserve forests 
and improve the welfare of local forest users, especially those in the developing world who rely 
on the forest for their livelihood. We urge better data accessibility and transparency on resource 
rights and other institutional settings.  
 
2.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
2.9.1 Implementing resource rights solutions without differentiating the potential effects of 
specific modes of rights and their combinations may result in varied forest outcomes 
The data application of our study supports Schlager and Ostrom’s analysis only for certain 
modes of rights. For instance, having a right to lease or a right to collateralize and to lease has no 
correlation with preventing deforestation but has a positive effect on reducing deforestation. A 
complete set of alienation rights has a negative effect on preventing deforestation but a positive 
effect on reducing deforestation. While Schlager and Ostrom advanced Hardin’s work by 
differentiating property rights into specific bundles of rights, our study proves that it is necessary 
to further zoom into the details. This requires making Schlager and Ostrom’s approach more 
complex by differentiating the modes of alienation rights and understanding the effect of them. 
Rather than analyzing the alienation rights as a general term on an aggregated level, it is critically 
important to assess the effects of different modes of alienation rights, if we intend to rely on 
property rights as a means to avoid or reduce deforestation.  
 
Therefore, previous studies based on the assumption that the alienation rights all have the 
same directional effect can have misleading conclusions. And hence policies solely relying on 
increasing the extent of forest property rights or allocating a more complete set of rights to forest 
users may not prevent or reduce gross deforestation. We must be aware that allocating alienation 
rights to local forest users without differentiating their potential effects may result in undesired 
forest outcomes. When some modes of alienation rights may link to positive forest outcomes, 
some others may not. Furthermore, the effects of the alienation rights depend on socioeconomic 
and biophysical conditions.  
 
2.9.2 Ignorance of local context may lead to undesired forest outcomes 
The results show that alienation rights’ effects vary across locations when it comes to 
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preventing deforestation. For the locations analyzed in this study, the effect of having a right to 
lease or a complete set of alienation rights is positive on lands with higher altitude, while the 
effect of having a right to collateralize and to lease is negative at locations with higher 
precipitation, higher soil productivity and higher population. In the case of reducing gross 
deforestation, the integration effects are mostly negative. The results suggest that although the 
right to sell and to collateralize correlate with positive direct effects, allocating these rights to 
lands with larger forest, higher precipitation, higher population density or lands far away from 
main roads will turn those effects into negative impacts. These interactions will contribute to a 
significant amount of deforestation. Therefore, rather than addressing land tenure as a vague and 
general term, we urge that decision makers, international donor organizations and academic 
researchers be aware of the diverse and contradictory effects of specific modes of rights. It is 
important to be aware of these mixed effects of some modes of alienation rights and associated 
complications when taking into consideration their dependence on local biophysical and 
socioeconomic conditions.  
 
We must therefore recognize that private property rights cannot prevent a tragedy of the 
commons in all conditions. Instead of relying on land tenure or property rights as a “one-size-fits-
all” solution for forest commons, we urge the fostering of local institutions that can develop 
location-smart solutions that adapt to the local biophysical and socioeconomic context. 
 
2.9.3  Urge the crafting of complementary and alternative solutions 
One observation from the analysis is that whether or not the forest users have the right to 
change use of the land could be critically important. While tenants normally do not have the 
power to change land use but to maintain it, the right to lease does not lead to more deforestation 
and even reduces gross deforestation, compared to the other alienation rights categories. 
Furthermore, the aggregated effects of the right to lease are positive, regardless whether 
preventing deforestation or reducing deforestation is concerned. Therefore, entitling forest users 
with alienation rights, while setting up constraints to land use conversion on the demand side, 
could be an option for preventing and reducing deforestation. While the direct effects of the right 
to collateralize and lease and a complete set of alienation rights are positive when it comes to 
reducing deforestation, their interactions with local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions are 
mostly negative. And the negative effects are greater than the positive effects for preventing 
deforestation and for reducing deforestation. In addition, allocating a complete set of alienation 
rights to a community could accelerate deforestation.  
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In the cases where the aforementioned negative effects occur and deforestation takes place, 
although the local forest owners may be made better off by exercising their right to sell and their 
right to collateralize, society could suffer from negative externalities - losing ecosystem services 
such as carbon sequestration, water purification and biodiversity. While we recognize the 
importance of empowering local forest users with more rights, we urge the crafting of 
complementary solutions that will seize the positive aspects while avoiding undesirable 
outcomes. Options include providing forest loans to encourage forest users to delay the exercise 
of the alienation rights and to invest in the forest resources for higher profit in the long run; 
payment for ecosystem services assessment; REDD+ to invest in forests as carbon sinks; and 
forest certification to encourage responsible management practices. These mechanisms must be in 
place to may create good enough incentives for landowners to maintain their land and protect 
forest resources.  
 
In summary, each mode of alienation rights performs differently when preventing and 
reducing deforestation are concerned. And the performances of the alienation rights depend on 
the local biophysical and socioeconomic circumstances. In addition, we should be aware that the 
negative effects of the right to collateralize and to lease or a complete set of alienation rights 
surpass their positive effects in preventing and reducing deforestation. Therefore, we should not 
assume that property rights would ultimately lead to desired forest outcomes under all local 
conditions. Rather, we should look into the details to understand the specific effect of each mode 
and their constraints under various local circumstances to develop complementary and alternative 
solutions on the ground to minimize the possible negative impacts and to grasp the positive ones. 
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CHAPTER 3. THINKING LIKE A FOREST: HOW DO FORESTS 
RESPOND TO SPECIFIC HUMAN INSTITUTIONS UNDER 
LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
3.1 Introduction 
In this study, I use data integration and data analysis methods to explore the roles of 
biophysical, socioeconomic and institutional variables, using data from the International Forestry 
Resources and Institutions (IFRI) datasets and a wide range of best available multiple public 
sources. These data have a much richer set of predictors. These data provide opportunities as well 
as new challenges.  
 
First, many forest commons studies based on the IFRI dataset used user perception to 
measure the forest outcomes, rather than using the physical measurements of forest conditions 
(i.e. deforestation, reforestation, biodiversity). For instance, Andersson and Agrawal (2011) 
measured forest outcomes by asking local households their perception of forest conditions. 
Physical measures of forest outcomes could provide different results, as local households may 
have positively-skewed views about the forest under their management. Besides, the user 
perception may not solely align with physical forest outcomes such as gross deforestation. 
Instead, it could include a wider range of concerns, such as the livelihood and welfare generated 
from the forest. There are good reasons behind the approach of using user perception to measure 
the forest outcomes, as forest coverage inventory from the ground is time consuming and labor 
intensive and hence may not be feasible when the dataset cover a wide range of countries 
globally. However, analysis based on potentially biased or unspecified forest outcomes could lead 
to misleading interpretations and conclusions.  
 
Forest outcomes measured by user perception can be replaced by physical gross deforestation 
data. In addition, a wide range of biophysical variables such as topographic, climate, soil 
conditions, population and road accessibility can be incorporated into the model. Instead of 
preselecting a relatively small variable set or create index system to reduce the number of 
variables, I apply Elastic Net and LASSO statistical methods to select significant individual 
variables from the large number of predictors and their interaction terms in a dataset with 
relatively small sample size without excessive loss of information. Details of the data integration 




Also, given the complexity of the system, a large number of factors can be critical to the 
sustainability of common pool resources. The necessity to incorporate the interaction terms 
(increase the number of variables) when studying a highly interactive system would make the 
situation even more challenging. In addition, studies tend to create additive indexes, either with or 
without weighting. For instance, a) Andersson and Agrawal creates collective action index by 
adding up five binary variables on collective action related activities (Andersson and Agrawal, 
2011); b) Coleman (2011) developed a weighted organizational capacity index to incorporate a 
series of user group activities related to collective actions based on principle component analysis. 
This approach may be useful to reduce number of variables with relatively small sample size. 
However, an index system can be misleading. In case a), the presumption that all activities have 
positive effects might not hold true with equal weighting. In case a) and b), adding up the 
individual variables may result in neglecting important detailed effects of the individual variables.  
 
3.2 Data and Data Processing 
3.2.1 Data Description 
Two sets of variables are included in the analysis: 1) the response variables, referring to 
gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013; 2) the predictive variables, which include forest 
property rights and collective action, biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. The data are 
collected from best available multiple public sources. Details of the variables are summarized in 
Table 8.  
 
In the study sites of the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), more than 
one user-group uses and manages the forests at the same time, under diverse management 
schemes. There is no clear boundary of the forests for the users. In this case, we assume that 
people’s activities are constrained by their ability to travel and the local circumstances such as 
slope and altitude. Hypothetical boundaries within travel distance (i.e. 1, 2 or 5 kilometers) are 
drawn from the center of the settlement, as data statistics indicate the households live within 1 to 
5 kilometers from the forests they rely on, with an average value of around 2 kilometers. The area 
within the boundaries will be the unit of analysis. 
 
The response variable is the gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013, measured in the 
form of the total area of deforestation within the hypothetical boundaries. The spatial resolution 
of the original data is 30-meters (Hansen et al., 2013). The gross deforestation is calculated by 
multiplying the number of pixels within each of the hypothetical boundaries by 900 square meters 
(the size of the pixels). 
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Table 8 Summary of Data 
 
The institutional variables are collected from a site-specific survey questionnaire, which 
includes three forest property rights: a) forest ownership; b) right to withdrawal and c) right to 
sell, and four collective action variables: a) existence of rules; b) congruence between rules and 
local conditions; c) monitoring; and d) graduated sanction. (IFRI, 2015) The institutional 
variables are calculated as either the mean or majority of the data value in the original dataset, 
depending on whether the variable is continuous or categorical. These variables are selected 
Variables Details 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Gross deforestation Gross deforestation between 2000 and 2013, measured in the form of the total 
area of deforestation within 1, 2 and 5 kilometers radius from the center of the 
study sites (Hansen, 2013) 
PREDICTIVE VARIABLES 
Property Rights  
Right to exclude A categorical variable indicating whether the forests is under community, 
government, private ownership or is openly accessed (IFRI, 2015) 
Right to withdrawal A dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the local users have the right 
to withdrawal timber and non-timber products from the forests, data available  
(IFRI, 2015) 
Right to alienate A dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the local users have the right 
to sell their forests (IFRI, 2015) 
Collective Actions  
Existence of rules The number of rules adopted to restrict usage, maintenance and management of 
the forests (IFRI, 2015) 
Congruence between rules and local 
conditions 
A dichotomous variable indicating whether the forest users consider the type of 
conversion measures adopted in relation to the forests is at the right level (IFRI, 
2015) 
Monitoring A dichotomous variable indicating whether the harvesters of forest products 
from different user groups readily observed by each other while harvesting 
(IFRI, 2015) 
Graduated sanction A dichotomous variable indicating whether there are graduated sanctions for 
rule breakers (IFRI, 2015) 
Biophysical   
Altitude Mean altitude of the community forestland (Jarvis et al., 2008) 
Temperature Annual mean temperature between 2000 and 2010 (Hijmans et al., 2005) 
Precipitation Annual mean precipitation between 2000 and 2010 (Hijmans et al., 2005) 
Size of forest Forest coverage in 2000, measure in the form of total area of forest within 1, 2 
and 5 kilometers radius from the center of the study sites  (Hansen, 2015) 
Soil productivity Global Soil Productivity Index, range from 0 to 1 (UNEP, 2016) 
Soil texture Categorical variables indicating whether the top- (0-30cm) and subsoil (30-
100cm) texture is coarse, medium or fine (Batjes, 2012) 
Soil pH level The pH levels of the soil in top- and sub soil. (Batjes, 2012) 
Soil organic carbon level The organic carbon level in top- and sub soil. (Batjes, 2012) 
Soil base saturation level Sum of exchangeable cations (nutrients) Na, Ca, Mg and K as a percentage of 
the overall exchange capacity of the top- and subsoil.(Batjes, 2012) 
Road accessibility Distance to main road (CIESIN, 2013) 
Socioeconomic  
Population Mean population of 2000, 2005 and 2010 (GPWv4) (CIESIN, 2015) 
Commercial value of the forest A categorical variable indicating whether the commercial value of the forest is 
below normal, normal or above normal (IFRI, 2015) 
Forest management unit A dichotomous variable indicating whether the forest has been divided into 
management units 
Unit of Analysis  
Hypothetical boundaries within 
travel distances 
The spatial document outlining the buffer zone 1, 2 and 5 kilometers from the 
center of the sites 
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based on relevance to theoretical frameworks and data availability. 
 
The biophysical variables include altitude, temperature, precipitation, forest coverage in 2000, 
and five soil properties: a) productivity; b) texture; c) pH level; d) organic carbon and e) base 
saturation level. The spatial resolution of the altitude data is 90-meters (Jarvis et al., 2008). The 
temperature and precipitation data are available at 1-kilometers resolution (Hijmans et al., 2005). 
The resolution of the forest coverage data is 30-meters (Hansen et al., 2013). The resolution of 
the soil properties data is 1-kilometers (Batjes, 2012). The mean altitude, temperature and 
precipitation are the values of average altitude, temperature and precipitation within each of the 
hypothetical boundaries, respectively. The forest coverage in 2000 is calculated by multiplying 
the number of pixels within each of the hypothetical boundaries by 900 square meters. The soil 
properties are either the mean or majority of the original dataset, depending on whether the 
variable is continuous or categorical.  
 
The socioeconomic variables include population, road inaccessibility, commercial value of 
the forest and forest management unit. The spatial resolution of the population data is 1 kilometer 
(CIESIN, 2014). The total population is calculated as the sum of the number of individuals within 
each of the community forest boundaries. The road inaccessibility variable is generated from the 
Global Roads Open Access Data Set (CIESIN, 2013), calculated as the distance between the sites 
and the nearest main roads. The commercial value of the forest and forest management unit are 
calculated as the majority of the value of the variables in the original dataset  
 
3.2.2 Data Processing 
The data layers are overlaid based on coordinates and a dataset is generated for each of the 
hypothetical boundaries, following the steps below: 
Step1: Obtain the coordinates of the study sites and link the sites to forest change, biophysical 
and socioeconomic variables maps 
Step 2: Draw buffer zone of 1, 2 and 5 kilometers radius from the center of the study sites  
Step 3: Calculate the area of forest change, average or majority of the biophysical and 
socioeconomic variables within the buffer zones 




Figure 3 Linking site-specific survey data with spatial data 
 
3.2.3 Data Summary 
After data integration, data from 162 sites in Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, Tanzania, Thailand and 
Uganda are analyzed. The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 9. The valid 
number of observations is 82 within 1-kilometer radius, 93 within 2-kilometer radius and 99 
within 5-kilometer radius. Between 2000 and 2013, the average gross deforestations are 0.1 
square kilometers, with a standard deviation of 0.2 square kilometers within 1-kilometer radius, 
0.5 square kilometers, with a standard deviation of 0.9 square kilometers within 2-kilometer 
radius and 2.4 square kilometers, with a standard deviation of 2.4 square kilometers within 5-
kilometer radius. In terms of forest property rights, 65.1% of the forest users have the right to 
withdrawal of timber and non-timber products from the forests but only 30.2% of them have the 
right to sell the forests. The majority (81.1%) of the forests are under community ownership. 
Among the rest, 1.9% is owned by government, 6.6% is under private ownership and 10.4% is 
open access. For collective actions, the average number of forest rules is 4.1. The forest users in 
54.7% of the sites believe these forest rules are congruent with local conditions, the forest 
harvesting activities in 57.5% of sites are under monitoring, and 39.6% of the sites apply 
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graduated sanction to the rule breakers. The ranges of the biophysical and socioeconomic 
variables are diverse.  
 
Table 9 Summary Statistics of the Variables 
  1-kilometer 2-kilometer 5-kilometer 
  Mean/ %  Std. Dev. Mean/ % Std. Dev. Mean/ % Std. Dev. 
Number of observations 82 93 99 
       
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
      Gross deforestation (square kilometers) 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 2.4 4.5 
PREDICTIVE VARIABLES 
      Property Rights 
      Right to withdrawal 65.1% - 65.1% - 65.1% - 
Right to alienate 30.2% - 30.2% - 30.2% - 
Forest ownership community 81.1% - 81.1% - 81.1% - 
Forest ownership government 1.9% - 1.9% - 1.9% - 
Forest ownership private 6.6% - 6.6% - 6.6% - 
Forest ownership open Access 10.4% - 10.4% - 10.4% - 
Collective Actions 
      Congruence between rules and local conditions 54.7% - 54.7% - 54.7% - 
Number of rules 4.1 - 4.1 - 4.1 - 
Monitoring 57.5% - 57.5% - 57.5% - 
Graduate sanction 39.6% - 39.6% - 39.6% - 
Biophysical  
      Size of forest (km2) 1.2 1.1 5.0 4.2 30.4 24.0 
Altitude (m) 918.8 676.4 918.3 674.1 933.9 687.7 
Precipitation (mm/yr) 1,462.8 573.4 1,463.2 571.0 1,454.6 552.5 
Temperature (°C) 22.1 3.7 22.1 3.7 22.0 3.8 
Soil productivity Index 4.0 0.9 4.0 0.9 4.0 0.9 
Topsoil texture coarse 24.5% - 26.4% - 24.5% - 
Topsoil texture medium 52.8% - 50.9% - 50.9% - 
Topsoil texture fine 22.6% - 22.6% - 24.5% - 
Subsoil texture coarse 17.0% - 18.9% - 17.9% - 
Subsoil texture medium 33.0% - 31.1% - 31.1% - 
Subsoil texture fine 50.0% - 50.0% - 50.9% - 
Topsoil pH level 6.1 1.1 6.1 1.1 6.1 1.2 
Subsoil pH level 4.9 2.4 4.9 2.3 4.9 2.3 
Topsoil organic carbon level 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.9 
Subsoil organic carbon level 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Topsoil base saturation level 68.1 26.8 68.6 26.2 68.7 25.4 
Subsoil base saturation level 51.6 33.6 51.6 32.5 50.8 30.9 
Road inaccessibility (km) 3,500.5 4,845.8 3,500.5 4,845.8 3,500.5 4,845.8 
Socioeconomic 
      Population within radius 481.0 869.0 1,812.0 2,960.0 10,472.9 17,344.1 
Commercial value of the forest above normal 52.8% - 52.8% - 52.8% - 
Commercial value of the forest normal 31.1% - 31.1% - 31.1% - 
Commercial value of the forest below normal 16.0% - 16.0% - 16.0% - 
Forest management unit 44.3% - 44.3% - 44.3% - 
 
3.3 Statistical Methodology 
A four-step analysis is implemented to answer the research questions (Figure 4). Linear 
regression models are applied to analyze the variables’ relationship with deforestation. By elastic 
net and LASSO variable selection, correlated variables are selected from the existing 29 first-
order predictors and 180 second-order predictors, with relatively small number of observations 
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(82, 93 and 99 at 1, 2 and 5 kilometer radius, respectively). The number of predictors is largely 
reduced without excessive information loss. Finally, by applying cross validation on model 
selection, the prediction errors of models with and without interactions are compared to 
understand the role of interaction effects. The models are normalized in order to compare the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates. Log transformation is made wherever necessary to 
improve the normality of the concerned variables. 
 
Figure 4 Data Analysis Framework 
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3.3.1 Regression Analysis 
Considering the distribution of the dependent variable (log transformation of gross 
deforestation), linear regression models are applied in the study. The models assume a wide 
variety of location variables or their proxies could lead to different forest outcomes.  
 
3.3.2 Variable Selection 
Variable selections based on LASSO and Elastic Net penalties are conducted on the models 
with interaction terms to determine the important variables correlated with deforestation. We use 
a 10-fold cross-validation for finding the tuning parameter. After variable selection, the model 
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is the elastic net penalty, a compromise between the Ridge regression penalties (𝛼𝛼 = 0) and 
the LASSO penalty (𝛼𝛼 = 1) (Friedman et. al., 2010; Zou and Hastie, 2005; Tibshirani, 1996; 
Hoerl and Kennard, 1970).  
 
3.3.3 Outlier Analysis 
The Interquartile Range rule is applied to determine the outliers. After fitting the regressions, 
observations with residuals that fall outside the below range are identified as outliers and are 
removed from the dataset (Montgomery and Runger, 2010).  
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑄𝑄1 − 1.5(𝑄𝑄3 − 𝑄𝑄1) 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑄𝑄3 + 1.5(𝑄𝑄3 − 𝑄𝑄1) 
𝑄𝑄1and 𝑄𝑄3 are the first and third quartile, respectively. 
 
3.3.4 Cross Validation 
Cross-validation is applied to compare the prediction error of the models with and without 
interaction terms. Cross-validation involves randomly splitting the data into two pieces: the 
training set T and the validation set V. The prediction error is estimated by validating the training 
set with the validation set. In this way an unbiased estimate of how well future data are predicted 
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could be obtained. The classifier h is constructed from the training set and the prediction error is 
estimated by below formula, where n is the size of the validation set (Kohavi, 1995). A 10-fold 
cross validation is applied in the study. 





3.4 Estimates and Inferences 
The Elastic Net penalty (MSE = 3.31) variable selection on the model with interaction terms 
and the LASSO penalty on the model without interaction terms (Mean Square Error = 2.87) have 
the lowest MSE at 1-km radius. The LASSO penalty (MSE = 2.98) on the model with interaction 
terms and the Elastic Net penalty (MSE = 3.38) on the models without interaction terms have the 
lowest MSE at 2-km radius. The Elastic Net penalty (MSE = 2.84) on model with interaction 
term and the LASSO penalty (MSE = 3.02) on the model without interaction terms have the 
lowest MSE at 5-km radius (Appendix: Figure 9). These models are chosen for further inferences. 
The results of models with interaction terms (Table 10) show that none of the forest rights 
variables and collective action variables are directly correlated with gross deforestation, at 1-
kilometer, 2-kilometer or 5-kilometer radius. However, the forest property rights and collective 
actions variables interact with biophysical and socioeconomic terms and come out with diverse 
outcomes. Having a right to withdrawal on lands with higher topsoil base saturation at 2-km 
radius or forests with above normal commercial value at 5-km radius decreases gross 
deforestation (-0.88, P = 0.07 and -2.48, P = 0.00, respectively), compared to the reference group 
(no withdrawal right on lands with lower topsoil base saturation and no withdrawal right on 
forests with above normal commercial value, respectively). Having the right to sell on lands with 
higher precipitation accelerates reduction of gross deforestation at 1-km, 2-km and 5-km radius (-
1.21, P = 0.01; -0.96, P=0.01 and -1.39, P = 0.01, respectively), compared to the reference group 
(without right to sell on lands with lower precipitation). However, having the right to sell on lands 
with fine topsoil texture accelerates gross deforestation at 1-km radius (1.88, P = 0.07). 
 
For collective actions, having rules congruent with local conditions on fine topsoil texture 
accelerates gross deforestation at 1-km and 2-km radius (1.75, P = 0.04; 1.66, P=0.00), compared 
to the reference group (no rule congruence on lands with coarse topsoil texture). Having rules 
congruent with local conditions on fine subsoil texture accelerates gross deforestation at 1-km 
and 10-km radius (1.20, P = 0.05; 1.07, P =0.04). Having monitoring on lands with higher 
precipitation accelerates gross deforestation at 1-km radius (0.78, P =0.01). On the other hand, 
having rule congruence on lands with medium subsoil texture decreases gross deforestation at 2-
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km radius (-1.11, P = 0.00). Having more forest management rules on medium topsoil texture and 
fine subsoil texture decreases deforestation at 1-km radius (-1.42, P =0.04; -1.16, P = 0.04), 
compared to the reference group (having less forest management rules on coarse topsoil texture, 
coarse subsoil texture or forests not divided into management unit). Having more forest 
management rules on forests divided into management units also decreases gross deforestation at 
1-km and 2km radius (-0.70, P = 0.09; -0.93, P =0.00).  
 
Table 10 Linear Estimate of Gross Deforestation (log) with Interaction Terms3 
  
1-km 2-km 5-km 
Estimate Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept) 10.47 0.00 *** 11.83 0.00 *** 14.98 0.00 *** 





 Altitude -0.02 0.92 
       Subsoil texture fine 
      
0.02 0.99 
 Subsoil texture medium 
      
-0.53 0.66 
 Topsoil Organic Carbon (log) -0.29 0.66 
 
-0.13 0.63 
    Subsoil Organic Carbon (log) -0.20 0.77 
       Topsoil pH 
      
0.04 0.93 
 Topsoil base saturation 
      
-0.89 0.06 . 
Subsoil base saturation 0.18 0.75 
       Forest ownership government 




 Forest ownership private 
      
-0.93 0.62 
 Right to sell 
      
0.26 0.55 
 Number of rules 0.88 0.10 
       Graduated Sanction 
      
-0.08 0.85 
 Right to withdraw: Topsoil texture medium -0.78 0.16 
       Right to withdraw: Topsoil pH 0.06 0.94 
 
0.35 0.42 
    Right to withdraw: Topsoil base saturation 
   
-0.88 0.07 . 
   Right to withdraw: Subsoil base saturation -1.22 0.17 
       Right to withdraw: Forests Commercial Value Above Normal 
      
-2.48 0.00 *** 
Right to withdraw: Forests Commercial Value Normal 
      
0.60 0.18 





 Forest ownership community: Altitude 
   
-0.34 0.53 
    Forest ownership private: Altitude 
   
1.99 0.48 
    Forest ownership private: Temperature -1.87 0.40 
       Forest ownership community: Topsoil texture fine -0.33 0.86 
 
0.34 0.82 
    Forest ownership private: Topsoil texture fine -2.08 0.20 
       Forest ownership community: Subsoil texture fine 
      
0.85 0.72 
 Forest ownership government: Topsoil Organic Carbon (log)  -0.54 0.32 
 
-0.46 0.17 
    Forest ownership community: Topsoil pH 
      
-0.10 0.91 
 Forest ownership government: Subsoil base saturation -0.22 0.69 
       
                                                        
3 Due to the length issue (209 predictors when interactions are taken into account), the table only presents variables selected in at least 




Table 10 Linear Estimate of Gross Deforestation (log) with Interaction Terms (continued) 
 1-km 2-km 5-km 
 Estimate Pr(>|t|)  Estimate Pr(>|t|)  Estimate Pr(>|t|)  
Forest ownership community: Population (log) 
   
-0.15 0.74 
    Forest ownership community: Inaccessibility (log) 




 Forest ownership government: Inaccessibility (log) -0.19 0.43 
    
-0.51 0.01 * 
Forest ownership community: Forests Commercial Value Normal 1.95 0.04 * 
      Forest ownership community: Forest management unit -0.67 0.66 
       Right to sell: Forest Coverage 
   
0.75 0.03 * 0.54 0.34 
 Right to sell: Precipitation -1.21 0.01 * -0.96 0.01 ** -1.39 0.01 ** 
Right to sell: Topsoil texture fine  1.88 0.07 . -0.05 0.95 
    Right to sell: Subsoil texture fine -0.88 0.20 
       Right to sell: Topsoil Organic Carbon (log) 
   
-0.03 0.95 
    Right to sell: Subsoil base saturation:  0.53 0.30 
 
0.20 0.57 
    Right to sell: Forest management unit 0.33 0.69 
 
0.84 0.20 
    Rule Congruence: Forest Coverage 0.15 0.70 
 
0.42 0.18 
    Rule Congruence: Soil productivity 0.47 0.26 
       Rule Congruence: Topsoil texture fine 1.75 0.04 * 1.66 0.00 ** 
   Rule Congruence: Subsoil texture fine 1.20 0.05 * 
   
1.07 0.04 * 
Rule Congruence: Subsoil texture medium 
   
-1.11 0.00 ** -0.33 0.60 
 Rule Congruence: Subsoil texture coarse  
      
0.94 0.40 
 Rule Congruence: Topsoil base saturation:  -0.09 0.81 
       Rule Congruence: Forests Commercial Value Above Normal -0.86 0.26 
       Number of rules: Precipitation  -0.20 0.46 
       Number of rules: Soil productivity 0.10 0.72 
       Number of rules: Topsoil texture medium  -1.42 0.04 * 
      Number of rules: Subsoil texture fine -1.16 0.04 * 
      Number of rules: Subsoil Organic Carbon(log) 
      
0.11 0.68 
 Number of rules: Topsoil pH 0.55 0.42 
       Number of rules: Subsoil pH 
      
-0.10 0.67 
 Number of rules: Topsoil base saturation -0.60 0.40 
 
-0.14 0.44 
    Number of rules: Forest management unit -0.70 0.09 . -0.93 0.00 *** 
   Forest Coverage: Monitoring 
      
-0.39 0.42 
 Precipitation: Monitoring 0.78 0.01 * 
      Soil productivity: Monitoring 
      
-0.41 0.31 
 Topsoil Organic Carbon (log):Monitoring 0.10 0.85 
       Subsoil Organic Carbon (log):Monitoring -0.32 0.64 
       Topsoil pH: Monitoring 




 Monitoring: Population (log) 
   
-0.08 0.74 
    Monitoring: Inaccessibility (log) -0.42 0.17 
       Monitoring: Forests Commercial Value Above Normal -0.17 0.81 
       Forest Coverage: Graduated Sanction 




 Soil productivity: Graduated Sanction 
      
-0.16 0.68 
 Topsoil texture fine: Graduated Sanction -1.09 0.17 
 
0.82 0.12 
    Graduated Sanction: Forest management unit -0.63 0.29          
          
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
          
Multiple R-squared/Adjusted R-squared 0.846/0.672  0.799/0.712 0.784/0.632 
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By assessing the parameter estimates, we found that the following forest property-right-
related-terms have greater effects: interaction terms of community forest ownership and forests 
with normal commercial value (1.95), right to sell with fine topsoil texture (1.88) and rule 
congruence with fine topsoil texture (1.75) at 1-km radius; rule congruence with fine topsoil 
texture (1.66) and with medium subsoil texture (-1.11), right to sell with precipitation (-0.96) and 
number of rules with forest management unit (-0.93) at 2-km radius; right to withdraw and forests 
with above normal commercial value (-2.48), right to sell with precipitation (-1.39) and rule 
congruence with fine subsoil texture (1.07). 
 
The results of models without interaction terms (Appendix: Table 13) show that none of the 
forest property rights and collective action variables is correlated with gross deforestation, at 1-
km, 2-km and 5-km radius. Gross deforestation is determined by the biophysical and 
socioeconomic variables only.  
 
Cross validation on models with and without interaction terms show that the models without 
interaction terms at 1-km and 5-km radius have smaller prediction errors (MSE = 2.93 and 2.82, 
respectively). However, the model with interaction terms at 2-km radius comes with smaller 
prediction error (MSE = 2.28).  
 
Table 11 Cross Validation on models with and without interaction terms 
  
MSE 
1-km 2-km 5-km 
With Interactions 6.26 2.28 3.33 
Without Interactions 2.93 2.31 2.82 
 
This section only presents the results of the statistical analysis and the interpretations of the 
inferences will be given in section 3.5. 
 
3.5 Analysis 
It is interesting to find that the model with interaction terms provides better prediction of 
gross deforestation only at 2-km radius, while the models without interaction terms predict better 
at 1-km and 5-km radius. The results suggest that the influence of institutional arrangements is 
constrained by the local users’ range of forest-related activities. At 1-km radius from the sites, the 
areas may be largely occupied by residential buildings and agricultural lands, rather than the 
forests. At 5-km radius, the forests are far away from the settlements. The local users might not 
travel for such a long distance to those forests on a daily basis and hence institutional 
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arrangement could play a less significant role. In either case, although institutional arrangements 
do interact with local conditions, gross deforestation is better explained by biophysical and 
socioeconomic conditions directly, such as soil properties and road accessibility. Nevertheless, at 
2-km radius, the average distance from the villages to nearby forest, institutional arrangements do 
play an important role through interactions with local biophysical and socioeconomic 
circumstances. 
 
By looking into the 2-km model 4, analysis finds that none of the forest property rights 
variables, right to withdraw, forest ownership and right to sell, has direct correlation with gross 
deforestation, compared to the reference groups (no right to withdrawal, open access and no right 
to sell). Neither do any of the collective actions arrangements - rule congruence, number of rules, 
and monitoring and graduated sanction - have direct correlation with gross deforestation, 
compared to the reference group (no rule congruence, less number of rules, no monitoring and no 
graduated sanction) (Table 12). The findings suggest that the institutional variables do not have 
direct impact on gross deforestation.  
 
When the interaction terms are taken into account, the forest property rights, a) right to 
withdrawal interacts with topsoil base saturation and b) right to sell interacts with precipitation, 
and both are negatively correlated with gross deforestation. However, c) the interaction terms of 
forest ownership again show no correlation with gross deforestation. The case a) implies that 
when local users are granted the right to withdraw and can rely on forests for their livelihood 
activities, they tend to maintain the forest, rather than clear-cutting them for other land use 
purposes (e/g. agricultural activities). Furthermore, such an effect gets accelerated when the right 
to withdraw is granted on lands with higher topsoil base saturation - the lands better for forests 
and forest products development (having higher nutrient availability and greater buffering against 
soil acidification). The finding of case b) is in line with Posner and Schagler and Ostrom’s model, 
which suggested that entitling owners to alienate their land may allow forest resources to be 
shifted from a less productive to a more productive use (Posner, 1975; Schagler and Ostrom, 
1992). Having the right to sell on the lands with higher precipitation (higher forest productivity) 
could further encourage such land ownership transfer and hence result in less gross deforestation. 
The finding is consistent with our previous work on forest alienation rights (Liu et. al, 2017). The 
                                                        
4 The 1-km and 5-km models are not discussed since: a) the models without interaction terms come with better prediction outcomes, 
however; b) none of the institutional variables are correlated with gross deforestation in the models without interaction terms. In both 
situations, gross deforestation is better explained by local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions rather than institutional 
arrangements-the variables of interest in the study. 
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case c) shows that forest ownership has no correlation at all with gross deforestation, either 
directly or indirectly. These findings suggest that the formal ownership of the forests does not 
matter when reducing gross deforestation is the concern. Rather, it is the specific resources rights 
granted that are having the impact. 
 
The effects of the interaction terms on collective action arrangements are diverse. On one 
hand, a) when local forest users believe the forest conservation rules are at an appropriate level at 
locations with fine topsoil texture, gross deforestation is accelerated, compared to the reference 
group (local users believe forest conservation rules are not at appropriate level and locations with 
coarse topsoil texture). On the other hand, b) when local forest users believe the forest 
conservation rules are at an appropriate level at locations with medium subsoil texture, gross 
deforestation is further reduced. The case a) and b) suggest that the local forest users’ 
interpretation of appropriateness of forest rules does not necessarily align with forest outcomes. 
Instead, user interpretations of appropriateness could reflect a wider range of considerations, such 
as the livelihood and welfare of the local users. The case a) implies that at locations with fine 
topsoil texture (good for nutrients and water retention and supply, compared to medium and 
coarse soil textures, and hence higher forest productivity), local users may tend to extract more 
forest resources and possibly lead to overexploitation. While in case b) where forest productivity 
is at medium level on medium subsoil texture, local users may tend to maintain forests for a more 
sustainable livelihood. In addition, c) having more rules on forests with divided management 
units decreases gross deforestation. The result suggests that when forest management unit is 
defined and rules are clearly specified, gross deforestation can be reduced effectively. 
 
Overall, when none of the institutional variables has a direct effect on gross deforestation at 
2-km, the aggregated indirect effects of significant forest property right variables are positive. 
The aggregated interaction effects of right to withdrawal (-0.88) and of right to sell (-1.01) are 
both positive, in terms of reducing gross deforestation. The aggregated indirect effects of 
significant collective action arrangements variables are mixed. The aggregated interaction effects 
of rule congruence are negative (0.55) and the aggregated interaction effects of number of rules 
are positive (-0.93), when reducing gross deforestation is concerned. 
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Table 12 Summary of the effects of institutional variables at 2-km radius 
  
Reducing Deforestation 
(Response: gross deforestation (log) at 2-km Radius) 
 
Direct Effect Interaction 
Right to withdraw No correlation Positive (-) (-0.88) 
Right to sell No correlation Positive (-) (-1.01) 
Forest ownership community No correlation No correlation (-) (-) 
Forest ownership government No correlation No correlation (-) (-) 
Forest ownership private No correlation No correlation (-) (-) 
Rule Congruence No correlation Negative (-) (0.55) 
Number of rules No correlation Positive (-) (-0.93) 
Monitoring No correlation No correlation (-) (-) 
Graduated Sanction No correlation No correlation (-) (-) 
 
3.6 Limitations of the Study 
Although the study was intended to incorporate a wide range of critical variables, I had to 
drop a few potentially important predictors, including collective choice arrangement and 
participation, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to manage and nested 
enterprises. This was largely due to missing data, as well as data spatial and thematic 
inconsistency when integrating site survey data with spatial data. In the IFRI data set, only the 
coordinates of the study sites, rather than the boundary and location of the forests, are available to 
link the site survey data with spatial data. As a result, the study has to rely on the study sites as 
the unit of analysis. However, the original dataset obtained from IFRI uses forests around the 
study sites as the unit of analysis. As the number of forests (442) is greater than the number of 
sites (323), the number of observations shrank substantially after data integration (162), 
especially after missing coordinates and accuracy of the coordinates are taken into account. This 
leaves not much room to incorporate the important variables with the relatively larger number of 
missing values. In addition, missing information regarding how far the sites are away from 
individual forests makes it impossible to better incorporate individual forests status into the final 
dataset based on location information. Instead, simple aggregation methods such as taking 
majority or mean of the variables are applied. The accuracy of the model estimates could be 




3.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
3.7.1 Specific actions matter: need to assess the effect of collective actions individually 
The findings of the study only supports Ostrom’s theory partially. First, not all design 
principles are effective as expected. For instance, two critical variables, monitoring and graduated 
sanction, show no correlation with gross deforestation either directly or indirectly. Despite 
whether or not graduated sanction and monitoring exist, deforestation can still take place in 
various locations with different biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. Second, in the case 
when institutional design variables, such as number of rules and rule congruence, show 
significant correlation with gross deforestation, their effects are either positive or negative, 
depending on the local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. The design principles are 
useful guidelines for forest resources management, however the results suggest their effects could 
vary when it comes to implementation. 
 
The finding is contradictory to previous studies, which suggest all eight principles are well 
supported empirically (Cox et al., 2010). As discussed in section 2, three possible reasons could 
explain the contradiction: a) Many of the forest commons studies rely on the IFRI dataset for 
analysis and hence use user perception to measure forest outcomes; such indicators may not be 
accurate or specific enough and could lead to misleading results and conclusions. b) Studies 
creating an additive index to aggregately measure collective actions can provide important 
theoretical and practical findings. However, an index system measuring collective actions 
aggregately comes at a cost of omitting the unaggregated effects of specific actions. Even though 
the collective actions show positive effect in aggregate, their individual performance could vary. 
c) Due to segregation of disciplinary research and data deficiency, previous studies were not able 
to include biophysical and socioeconomic variables in the models. As a result, the institutional 
variables’ dependence on local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions is neglected. 
Introducing the interaction terms between institutional variables and biophysical/socioeconomic 
variables into the models will lead to different results and conclusions.  
 
The results suggest that we should not assume collective actions will ultimately lead to 
desired forest outcomes under all local conditions. Rather, we should look into the details to 
understand the specific effect of each action and their constraints under various local 
circumstances to guide us to design specific participatory mechanism on the ground to minimize 




3.7.2 Specific rights matter: Decentralization reform should recognize the limited 
understanding of property rights’ effects 
The data application of the study shows that none of the manners of forest ownership are 
correlated with gross deforestation, either directly or indirectly. However, the right to withdrawal 
and right to sell interact with local soil and climate conditions and the interaction effects are 
positive, in term of reducing gross deforestation. The results suggest that formal arrangements 
such as land ownership might not be as effective as expected. Rather, the specific rights are the 
ones that matter. Superficial interpretation of Hardin’s model as simply setting up formal 
institutions in the form of private property rights to the commons (Hardin, 1968) might not tackle 
the substance of the problem of the commons. After all, vague and general terms of land 
ownership or participatory management could vary widely without specification of details on 
rights and actions associated. 
 
Therefore, the forest reforms centered on decentralization of land ownership might not be 
relevant, if reducing gross deforestation is the concern. Instead of transferring land ownership 
from government to local users - believing that deforestation would be halted automatically 
through such transfer - the reforms might be reoriented towards granting specific rights to local 
users in order to induce desired outcomes. Nevertheless, we should also be aware of the 
dependence of rights and actions’ on local circumstances and their possible diverse outcomes. 
 
3.7.3 Local context matters: Impacts of institutional solutions vary with local context 
The results show that the effects of forest property rights and collective actions depend on 
local circumstances. While none of the property rights and collective action variables is directly 
correlated with gross deforestation, their indirect effects are significant through the interactions 
with soil, climate and socioeconomic variables. Through the analysis, two possible scenarios are 
observed. 
  
First, institutional variables measured through local users’ perception such as rule 
congruence (appropriateness of forest conservation rules) may be affected by local circumstances 
such as soil conditions. Local users’ interpretation of appropriateness of forest conservation rules 
includes a wider range of concerns (e.g. welfare or economic returns), in addition to forest 
outcomes. When the land is fertile (fine topsoil texture), the abundance of forest resources could 
lead to over-extraction from the forest. However, for land with medium level fertility (medium 
subsoil texture), the local users might not be overly extractive, in order to ensure sustainability of 
forest and livelihoods.  
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Second, even if institutional variables remain constant, they may only have effects on gross 
deforestation through their interactions with specific local conditions. For instance, the right to 
withdrawal negatively correlates with gross deforestation only when it is allocated to lands with 
higher topsoil base saturation. The right to sell negatively correlates with gross deforestation 
when it is allocated on lands with higher precipitation. Number of rules negatively correlates with 
gross deforestation only when forest management unit is clearly defined.  
 
We should also notice that the effects of forest property rights and collective actions are 
constrained by the local users’ range of forest-related activity. Only at 2-km radius, the average 
distance from the villages to nearby forests, does the model with institutional variables’ 
interaction terms with biophysical and socioeconomic conditions predict better than the one 
without. This result suggests that, in forest commons studies, it is important and necessary to 
incorporate the interaction of institutional variables with local biophysical and socioeconomic 
variables for better understanding of the complex human-nature system. 
 
We must therefore recognize that forest property rights and collective actions may not all 
perform as desired in all biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. We need to study and 
understand the diverse effects of individual actions in implementation, under various biophysical 
and socioeconomic circumstances. We need to understand such details, because only details will 
provide us with sufficiently specific information to guide actions on the ground in an effective 




CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
The studies, based on two separate sets of data, lead to conclusions pointing in the same 
direction. In chapter 2, the available data from 28,208 community forests in Cameroon, Colombia 
and Mexico indicate that the right to lease or the right to collateralize and to lease has a positive 
direct effect on reducing gross deforestation. A complete set of alienation rights has a negative 
direct effect on preventing deforestation (decreases the log-likelihood of zero deforestation) but a 
positive direct effect on reducing deforestation (reduces gross deforestation). Furthermore, the 
linkage of alienation rights to deforestation may also depend on local biophysical and socio-
economic conditions. The interaction effects of the right to lease can be positive, negative or no 
correlation depending on locations and on whether preventing or reducing deforestation is 
concerned. When the right to sell and to collateralize or a complete set of alienation rights 
directly correlate with positive impact on reducing gross deforestation, allocating these rights to a 
certain location correlates with negative impacts. The aggregated effects of the right to lease are 
positive on both preventing and reducing deforestation but the aggregated effects of having a 
right to collateralize and to lease or a complete set of alienation rights are negative with regard to 
either preventing or reducing deforestation. This study indicates that alienation of property rights 
can have varying effects on deforestation, depending on both the specifics of the alienation rights 
and local factors. 
 
Similarly in chapter 3, analysis of data from 162 sites in 15 countries indicates that the 
specific collective actions (existence of rules, rule congruence, monitoring and graduated 
sanction) and property rights (forest ownership, right to withdrawal and right to sell) perform 
differently with respect to gross deforestation. When looking into collective actions, not all 
actions are as effective as expected. Two critical variables, monitoring and graduated sanctions, 
show no correlation with gross deforestation either directly or indirectly. Number of rules and 
rule congruence show significant correlation with gross deforestation. Depending on the local 
biophysical and socioeconomic conditions, the effects are either positive or negative. With 
respect to property rights, none of the manners of forest ownership are correlated with gross 
deforestation, either directly or indirectly. However, the right to withdrawal and right to sell 
interact with local soil and climate conditions and the interaction effects are positive, in term of 




The results suggest that we should not assume property rights or collective actions will 
ultimately lead to desired forest outcomes under all local conditions. Rather, we should look at 
the details to understand the specific effect of each action and right, and their constraints under 
various local circumstances in order to develop complementary and alternative solutions on the 
ground, and to minimize the possible negative impacts and to achieve the positive ones. Only 
such details will provide us with sufficiently specific information to guide actions on the ground 
in an effective way to conserve forests to improve the welfare of local forest users, as well as the 
global community. 
 
The studies have potential to contribute to the common-pool resources theory development.  
First, the alienation rights study presented in Chapter 2 bridges Schlager and Ostrom’s alienation 
rights model with Clark’s. Schalger and Ostrom’s alienation rights model suggests entitling 
alienation rights to forest owners could introduce desired forest outcomes by allowing forest 
resources to be shifted from a less productive to a more productive use (Posner, 1975; Schagler 
and Ostrom, 1992). Clark’s economics of overexploitation model shows that even when property 
rights are in place, the forest outcome can be undesired, if the discount rate is high and when 
there are alternative investment options (Clark, 1973). The two models may seem contradictory, 
but the results of this study show that both Clark’s and Schagler and Ostrom’s models can explain 
forest outcomes, depending on what forest outcome is measured. When zero-deforestation is used 
as measurement, the negative correlation between alienation rights and zero-deforestation can be 
explained by Clark’s model; On the other hand, when gross deforestation is used as measurement, 
the positive correlation between alienation rights and gross deforestation can be explained by 
Schagler and Ostrom’s model. 
 
Second, the property rights and collective actions study presented in Chapter 3 complements 
Hardin’s tragedy of common model and Schlager and Ostrom’s alienation rights model. Chapter 
3 shows that none of the manners of forest ownership are correlated with gross deforestation, but 
the right to withdrawal and right to sell’s interaction effects are positive. The result suggest that 
superficial interpretation of Hardin’s model as simply setting up formal institutions in the form of 
private property rights to the commons (Hardin, 1968) might not tackle the substance of the 
problem of the commons. We should instead look into the details of the bundles of rights 
specified by Schlager and Ostrom (Schagler and Ostrom, 1992). Furthermore, the results of 
Chapter 3 indicate that when analyzing the specific rights, local conditions must be taken into 
consideration, as the specific rights’ performance can be either positive or of no correlation, 
 
 45 
depending on the local circumstances.  
 
Third, the study enhances Ostrom’s eight design principles for common pool resources 
management. Chapter 3 shows that the design principles may not all come out with desired forest 
outcomes in all biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. The effects of the design principles 
can be either positive, negative or of no correlation, depending on local circumstances. 
Furthermore, the results clarify that the effects of collective actions are constrained by the local 
users’ range of forest-related activity. Instead of presuming all design principles would lead to 
desired forest outcomes, one should understand the local conditions when implementing the 
design principles on the ground. 
 
There are many interesting research topics to explore beyond this dissertation. The first one 
would be assessing the institutional variables and their interaction terms’ correlation with gross 
reforestation. Property rights and collective actions may perform differently on gross 
reforestation, compared to their effects on gross deforestation. For instance, when the forest 
property right approach sets up a boundary in the forests, it could play a more significant role in 
reducing gross deforestation by excluding other users’ from one’s territory. However, it may not 
create an incentive for reforestation activities. On the other hand, collective actions may be more 
effective in increasing gross reforestation, as the actions on the ground would encourage local 
users to invest in maintenance and regeneration of the forests. However, without the right to 
exclude other users, the effects on reducing gross deforestation would be limited. Both 
mechanisms could be complementary to each other in sustainability of the forests. The existing 
literatures have yet not made such distinctions.  
 
A second topic is to evaluate how changes in specific institutions (i.e. more decentralized 
positive change, no change or less decentralized negative change) have affected forests in the past 
decade. We should not assume all positive changes in institutions (i.e. a more decentralized 
property rights scheme or a more participative local collective action mechanism) would lead to 
desired forest outcomes. It is highly possible that a more decentralized property rights scheme 
and the disturbance introduced by the change of schemes may lead to unexpected decisions with 
undesired outcomes, such as clear-cutting or selling forests on one’s own territory in order to 
catch the policy change. Similarly, it is also possible that a more participative local collective 
action mechanism and the disturbance of the change could lead to collective decisions of 
undesired outcomes, as local forest users may just collectively decide to overexploit forest 
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resources in the short-run when more users are introduced into the system. Understanding how 
forests respond to a changing world will have both theoretical and practical implications. After 





Figure 5 Distribution of Variables 
 
 
 Gross Deforestation Percentage Deforestation 
λ 0.02020202 0.1010101 






  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net (𝛼𝛼 = 0.5) 0.01962525 
LASSO (𝛼𝛼 = 1) 0.01432702 
 





8a Gross Deforestation Gamma Inverse-link 
 





8c Percentage Deforestation Gamma Inverse-link 
 
 





8e Gross Deforestation Truncated Normal 
 
 
8f Percentage Deforestation Truncated Normal 
 
Models AIC BIC 
Gross Deforestation Gamma-Inverse 448365.1 448614.6 
Gross Deforestation Gamma-log 474878.1 475129.3 
Percentage Deforestation Gamma-Inverse 131856.9 132076.7 
Percentage Deforestation Gamma-log 108638.2 108858.1 
Gross Deforestation Truncated Normal -83539.2 -83286.3 
Percentage Deforestation Truncated Normal -16515.0 -16293.5 
Figure 8 Variable Selection for Models on Gross and Percentage Deforestation 
 
 52 
9a Gross Deforestation Model with Interactions (1-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  3.31 
LASSO 3.33 
 
9b Gross Deforestation Model without Interactions (1-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  2.88 
LASSO 2.87 
 
Figure 9 Variable Selection for Models on Gross Deforestation with and without Interaction 
Terms at 1-kilometer Radius 
 
 53 
10a Gross Deforestation Model with Interactions (2-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  2.99 
LASSO 2.98 
 
10b Gross Deforestation Model without Interactions (2-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  2.89 
LASSO 2.84 
 
Figure 10 Variable Selection for Models on Gross Deforestation with and without 
Interaction Terms at 2-kilometer Radius 
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11a Gross Deforestation Model with Interactions (5-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  2.84 
LASSO 2.89 
 
11b Gross Deforestation Model without Interactions (5-kilometer) 
 
  Prediction Error 
Elastic Net  3.08 
LASSO 3.02 
Figure 11 Variable Selection for Models on Gross Deforestation with and without 
Interaction Terms at 5-kilometer Radius
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Table 13 Linear Estimate of Gross Deforestation (log) without Interaction Terms 
  
1-km 2-km 5-km 
Estimate Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept) 10.59 0.00 *** 11.87 0.00 *** 12.98 0.00 *** 
Forest coverage 1.00 0.00 *** 1.19 0.00 *** 1.47 0.00 *** 
Altitude -0.14 0.55 
    
-0.36 0.62 
 Precipitation 
         Temperature 
      
0.14 0.86 
 Soil productivity 0.25 0.24 
    
-0.16 0.50 
 Topsoil texture fine 0.78 0.47 
    
0.71 0.45 
 Topsoil texture medium -0.15 0.84 
    
-0.13 0.83 





 Subsoil texture medium -0.89 0.24 
 
-1.64 0.00 *** -2.10 0.01 ** 
Topsoil Organic Carbon (log) 




 Subsoil Organic Carbon (log) -0.82 0.01 ** 
      Topsoil pH 
   
-0.67 0.00 *** -0.32 0.60 
 Subsoil pH 
      
-0.14 0.85 
 Topsoil base saturation -1.01 0.00 *** 
   
-0.79 0.31 
 Subsoil base saturation 0.59 0.01 *** 0.37 0.04 * 0.54 0.47 
 Right to withdrawal -0.44 0.28 
       Forest ownership community 




 Forest ownership government 




 Forest ownership private 









 Rule Congruence 
      
-0.04 0.90 
 Number of rules -0.28 0.18 
    
-0.26 0.23 
 Monitoring -0.03 0.94 





 Population (log) 
         Inaccessibility (log) -0.43 0.03 * -0.43 0.02 * -0.46 0.02 * 
Forests Commercial Value Above Normal 
      
0.37 0.50 
 Forests Commercial Value Normal 
      
0.95 0.02 * 
Forest management unit -0.11 0.77               
          
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
          






Agrawal, Arun. “Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.” 
World Development 29, no. 10 (October 2001): 1649–72. doi:10.1016/S0305-
750X(01)00063-8. 
 
Agrawal, Arun, Ashwini Chhatre, and Rebecca Hardin. “Changing Governance of the World’s 
Forests.” Science 320, no. 5882 (June 13, 2008): 1460–62. doi:10.1126/science.1155369. 
 
Agrawal, Arun, and Elinor Ostrom. “Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in 
Resource Use in India and Nepal.” Politics & Society 29, no. 4 (December 1, 2001): 485–
514. doi:10.1177/0032329201029004002. 
 
Anderson, Jon. “Four Considerations for Decentralized Forest Management: Subsidiarity, 
Empowerment, Pluralism and Social Capital.” Decentralization and Devolution of Forest 
Management in Asia and the Pacific, 2000, 17–27. 
 
Andersson, Krister, and Arun Agrawal. “Inequalities, Institutions, and Forest Commons.” Global 
Environmental Change, Symposium on Social Theory and the Environment in the New 
World (dis)Order, 21, no. 3 (August 2011): 866–75. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.004. 
 
Andersson, Krister P., and Elinor Ostrom. “Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a 
Polycentric Perspective.” Policy Sciences 41, no. 1 (February 14, 2008): 71–93. 
doi:10.1007/s11077-007-9055-6. 
 
Araujo, Claudio, Catherine Araujo Bonjean, Jean-Louis Combes, Pascale Combes Motel, and 
Eustaquio J. Reis. “Property Rights and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.” Ecological 
Economics 68, no. 8–9 (June 15, 2009): 2461–68. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.12.015. 
 
Batjes, N. H. “Harmonized Soil Profile Data for Applications at Global and Continental Scales: 
Updates to the WISE Database.” Soil Use and Management 25, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 124–
27. doi:10.1111/j.1475-2743.2009.00202.x. 
 
Benoît Mertens, Gideon Neba Shu, Matthew Steil, and Bertrand Tessa. “Interactive Forest Atlas 
of Cameroon - Atlas Forestier Interactif Du Cameroun (Version 3.0) | World Resources 
Institute.” World Resource Institute, October 2012. 
http://www.wri.org/publication/interactive-forest-atlas-cameroon-version-30. 
 
Clark, Colin W. “The Economics of Overexploitation.” Science 181, no. 4100 (1973): 630–34. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1736934. 
 
Coleman, Eric A. “Common Property Rights, Adaptive Capacity, and Response to Forest 
Disturbance.” Global Environmental Change, Symposium on Social Theory and the 
Environment in the New World (dis)Order, 21, no. 3 (August 2011): 855–65. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.012. 
 
Cox, Michael, Gwen Arnold, and Sergio Villamayor Tomás. “A Review of Design Principles for 




Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia University. 
2015. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Count Adjusted to 
Match 2015 Revision of UN WPP Country Totals. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic 
Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4PR7SX1. Accessed 16 
July 2016. 
 
CIESIN, & ITOS. (2013). Global Roads Open Access Data Set, Version 1 (gROADSv1).  
Retrieved 20150107, from NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) 
 
Fisher, Robert J. “Devolution and Decentralization of Forest Management in Asia and the 
Pacific.” UNASYLVA-FAO-, 1999, 3–5. 
 
Friedman, Jerome, Trevor Hastie, and Rob Tibshirani. “Regularization Paths for Generalized 
Linear Models via Coordinate Descent.” Journal of Statistical Software 33, no. 1 (2010): 1–
22. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2929880/. 
 
Gertheiss, Jan, and Gerhard Tutz. “Penalized Regression with Ordinal Predictors.” International 
Statistical Review 77, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 345–65. doi:10.1111/j.1751-
5823.2009.00088.x. 
 
Hajjar, Reem, Johan A. Oldekop, Peter Cronkleton, Emily Etue, Peter Newton, Aaron J.M. 
Russel, Januarti Sinarra Tjajadi, Wen Zhou, and Arun Agrawal. “The Data Not Collected on 
Community Forestry.” Conservation Biology 30, no. 6 (December 1, 2016): 1357–62. 
doi:10.1111/cobi.12732. 
 
Hansen, M. C., P. V. Potapov, R. Moore, M. Hancher, S. A. Turubanova, A. Tyukavina, D. Thau, 
et al. “High-Resolution Global Maps of 21st-Century Forest Cover Change.” Science 342, 
no. 6160 (November 15, 2013): 850–53. doi:10.1126/science.1244693. 
 
Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, no. 3859 (December 13, 1968): 
1243–48. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243. 
 
Hijmans, Robert J., Susan E. Cameron, Juan L. Parra, Peter G. Jones, and Andy Jarvis. “Very 
High Resolution Interpolated Climate Surfaces for Global Land Areas.” International 
Journal of Climatology 25, no. 15 (December 1, 2005): 1965–78. doi:10.1002/joc.1276. 
 
Hoerl, Arthur E., and Robert W. Kennard. “Ridge Regression: Biased Estimation for 
Nonorthogonal Problems.” Technometrics 12, no. 1 (February 1, 1970): 55–67. 
doi:10.1080/00401706.1970.10488634. 
 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network. Global Dataset. 
Extracted from the IFRI Database 1992-2012. April 2015 
 
Kohavi, Ron. “A Study of Cross-Validation and Bootstrap for Accuracy Estimation and Model 
Selection.” In Ijcai, 14:1137–45, 1995. 
 
Montgomery, Douglas C., and George C. Runger. Applied Statistics and Probability for 




Jarvis, A., H.I. Reuter, A. Nelson, and E. Guevara. “Hole-Filled SRTM for the Globe Version 4, 
Available from the CGIAR-CSI SRTM 90m Database,” 2008. http://www.cgiar-
csi.org/data/srtm-90m-digital-elevation-database-v4-1. 
 
Kohavi, Ron. “A Study of Cross-Validation and Bootstrap for Accuracy Estimation and Model 
Selection.” In Ijcai, 14:1137–45, 1995. 
 
Larson, AnneM, and GangaRam Dahal. “Forest Tenure Reform: New Resource Rights for Forest-
Based Communities?” Conservation and Society 10, no. 2 (2012): 77. doi:10.4103/0972-
4923.97478. 
 
Larson, A.m., D. Barry, and Ganga Ram Dahal. “New Rights for Forest-Based Communities? 
Understanding Processes of Forest Tenure Reform.” International Forestry Review 12, no. 1 
(March 1, 2010): 78–96. doi:10.1505/ifor.12.1.78. 
 
Larson, Anne M., Esteve Corbera, Peter Cronkleton, Chris Van Dam, D. B. Bray, Manuel 
Estrada, Peter May, Gabriel Medina, Guillermo Navarro, and Pablo Pacheco. “Rights to 
Forests and Carbon under REDD+ Initiatives in Latin America.” Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia, 2010. 
 
Liu, Jianguo, Thomas Dietz, Stephen R. Carpenter, Marina Alberti, Carl Folke, Emilio Moran, 
Alice N. Pell, et al. “Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems.” Science 317, no. 
5844 (September 14, 2007): 1513–16. doi:10.1126/science.1144004. 
 
Liu, Wenman, Bryan Norton, Kamran Paynabar, Valerie Thomas (2017) “Details Matter: The 
effects of Alienation Property Rights on Deforestation.” Manuscript under review, Global 
Environmental Change. 
 
Mendelsohn, Robert. “Property Rights and Tropical Deforestation.” Oxford Economic Papers 46 
(1994): 750–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2663497. 
 
Montgomery, Douglas C., and George C. Runger. Applied Statistics and Probability for 
Engineers. John Wiley & Sons, 2010. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological 
Systems.” Science 325, no. 5939 (July 24, 2009): 419–22. doi:10.1126/science.1172133. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky. 
“Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no. 5412 (April 
9, 1999): 278–82. doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278. 
 
Pagdee, Adcharaporn, Yeon-su Kim, and P. J. Daugherty. “What Makes Community Forest 
Management Successful: A Meta-Study From Community Forests Throughout the World.” 





Palmer, Charles. “Property Rights and Liability for Deforestation under REDD+: Implications for 
‘permanence’ in Policy Design.” Ecological Economics 70, no. 4 (February 15, 2011): 571–
76. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.10.011. 
 
Posner, Richard. Economic Analysis of Law. Little Brown and Company, 1973. 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/books/77. 
 
Poteete, Amy R., and Elinor Ostrom. “Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action 
in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on 
Qualitative Research.” World Development 36, no. 1 (January 2008): 176–95. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.02.012. 
 
Rights and Resources Initiative, “What Future for Reform?” (March 26, 2014). 
http://www.rightsandresources.org/en/publication/what-future-for-reform/.  
 
Rights and Resources Initiative, “What Rights? Measuring the Depth of Indigenous Peoples and 
Community Forest Tenure.” May 2012. http://oldrri.pushdesign.net/pages.php?id=604. 
 
Robinson Djeukam, and J.-F. Gerber et S. Veuthey. “Forestry and Communities in Cameroon | 
CEECEC.” Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement, Friends of the Earth 
International, Cameroon. Accessed May 28, 2016. http://www.ceecec.net/case-
studies/forestry-and-communities-in-cameroon/. 
 





Schlager, Edella, and Elinor Ostrom. “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis.” Land Economics 68, no. 3 (1992): 249–62. doi:10.2307/3146375. 
 
Schwarz, Gideon. “Estimating the Dimension of a Model.” The Annals of Statistics 6, no. 2 
(March 1978): 461–64. doi:10.1214/aos/1176344136. 
 
Tibshirani, Robert. “Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso.” Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 58, no. 1 (1996): 267–88. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2346178. 
 
UNEP (2016): The UNEP Environmental Data Explorer, as compiled from Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) - TerraStat . United Nations Environment 
Programme. http://ede.grid.unep.ch. 
 
Verburg, Peter H., Kathleen Neumann, and Linda Nol. “Challenges in Using Land Use and Land 
Cover Data for Global Change Studies.” Global Change Biology 17, no. 2 (February 1, 
2011): 974–89. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2486.2010.02307.x. 
 
“USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance: Cameroon.” USAID, 
January 2011. http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/colombia. 
 
“USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance: Colombia.” USAID, 
September 2010. http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/colombia. 
 
 60 
White, Andy, and Alejandra Martin. “Who Owns the World’s Forests.” Forest Trends, 
Washington, DC, 2002. 
 
Winship, Christopher, and Robert D. Mare. “Regression Models with Ordinal Variables.” 
American Sociological Review 49, no. 4 (1984): 512–25. doi:10.2307/2095465. 
 
World Resource Institute, “Resource rights.” Accessed through Global Forest Watch on March 
2016. www.globalforestwatch.org. 
 
Zou, Hui, and Trevor Hastie. “Regularization and Variable Selection via the Elastic Net.” Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) 67, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 
301–20. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9868.2005.00503.x. 
